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COMMENTS
REGULATION OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS TO
PROTECT THE PUBLIC SHAREHOLDER
AND ENHANCE THE
CORPORATE IMAGE
Regulation of securities transactions is most often considered in the con-
text of corporations making stock offerings to the public. A corporation is
said to "go public" when it offers its shares for trade to the general public,
rather than to a relatively few private investors. The corporation, in such a
transaction, becomes classified as a public corporation. On the other hand, a
corporation is said to "go private" when it removes its publicly-traded shares
from the control of the general public and thereby ceases to be a publicly
reporting and trading company under the federal securities laws. Essen-
tially, the public corporation abandons the marketplace and becomes classi-
fied as a private corporation, with its shares being closely-held.
"Going private" transactions have been a subject of vast attention and
debate since 1974.' The leveraged buyout, a particular type of "going pri-
vate" transaction,2 recently has attracted widespread concern and debate
1. In 1974, A.A. Sommer, Jr., then a commissioner with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), described the "going private" transaction as "serious, unfair, and some-
times disgraceful, a perversion of the whole process of public financing, and a course that
inevitably is going to make the individual shareholder even more hostile to American corpo-
rate mores and the securities markets than he already is." A. Sommer, "Going Private": A
Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, (address at Notre Dame Law School), reprinted in SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 278, D-l, (Nov. 20, 1974). See Kaufman v. Lawrence, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,908, (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1974) (recognition that a public company "going
private" may raise serious public inquiry regarding protection of the public interest) See gen-
erally Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort, or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987 (1974);
Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV.
297 (1974).
2. The technique often implemented in a leveraged buyout transaction involves a merger
or a sale of the original company's assets to a shell corporation, in which only the control
group consisting of the management and certain other investors retain equity ownership in the
corporation. In either technique, the outside shareholders are eliminated from the company
and receive only cash consideration for their stock ownership. A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate
Laws, Guidelines on Going Private, 37 Bus. LAW. 313, 317 (1981). A significant amount of the
purchase price is borrowed by the control group, which pledges (leverages) the purchased
assets to secure repayment of the loan.
As an example of the merger technique, the transaction
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over its fairness to the public shareholder.3 With increasing frequency, The
Wall Street Journal and The New York Times are reporting on leveraged
buyout developments 4 and merger experts expect this torrid pace of buyout
activity to continue.5
starts with the formation by the control group of the original company of a new shell
corporation for the sole purpose of acquiring the control group's shares in the origi-
nal company. In exchange for these shares, the control group receives shares in the
shell corporation. Thus, the control group becomes the sole owner of the shell cor-
poration which, in turn, becomes the "parent" of the original company. The original
company is then merged into the shell (whose name is usually changed to that of the
original company). Under the terms of the merger, the outsiders receive cash or
securities redeemable for cash.
Id. at 316 (footnote omitted); Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1981) (describing
the mechanics of a "going private" transaction). See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490
F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974). For an example of the sale of assets
technique, which involves a sale for cash of substantially all the assets of a public company to a
shell corporation, followed by a dissolution of the public company, see A.B.A. Comm. on
Corporate Laws, supra, at 316 n. 11 (citing as an illustration Eisenberg v. Central Zone Prop-
erty Corp., 306 N.Y. 58, 115 N.E.2d 652 (1953)).
3. See B. Longstreth, Management Buyouts: Are Public Shareholders Getting A Fair
Deal? (Oct. 6, 1983) (remarks to the Int'l Bar Ass'n, published by the Securities and Exchange
Comm'n). As a commissioner with the Securities and Exchange Commission at the time of his
speech, Bevis Longstreth concluded that "[w]e see with increasing frequency the spectacle of a
conflicted management surrounding itself with procedural shields to defend a deal widely be-
lieved to be substantively unfair to shareholders. Such behavior is threatening to tarnish the
image of our corporate community-to give corporate fiduciaries a bad name." Id. at 17. See
also Why Leveraged Buyouts Are Getting So Hot, Bus. WK., June 27, 1983, at 86 (stating that
some people see the leveraged buyout as an insider's technique for taking advantage of outside
shareholders who do not know the value of their stock). Some institutional investors, however,
have expressed reluctance to participate in leveraged buyouts. Williams, Leveraged Buyouts
Are Encountering More Resistance From Lenders, Investors, Wall St. J., July 25, 1984, at 18,
col. 1. For example, Gary Wendt, executive vice president for financial operations at General
Electric Company's Stamford, Connecticut-based General Electric Credit Corporation unit,
stated: "We have to watch ourselves so that we don't chase rainbows, and we have to avoid
buyout promoters trying to unload old businesses they no longer want." Id.
The public debate over the fairness of leveraged buyouts is expected to continue. Congres-
sional hearings will be occurring throughout 1985 to consider generally the ramifications of
mergers and takovers. Among the specific topics to be discussed are shareholders' rights in
leveraged buyout transactions and the impact of the dramatic increase in debt appearing on the
balance sheets of companies that have gone private through the use of leveraged buyouts. See
Vise, Merger Experts See Torrid Pace Continuing in '85, Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 1985, at F8, col.
1.
4. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1984, at 10, col. 2 (Dr. Pepper Co., a publicly-owned soft
drink concern, proposed to its shareholders a $516 million buyout transaction which eventu-
ally settled at a purchase price of $650 million); Thomas, A Free Ride for Management Insid-
ers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1984, § 3, at 2, col. 2 (expressing that few readers of the financial
pages could have missed hearing about the leveraged buyout game). See also Waters, Banking
on the Entrepreneur. The Leveraged Buyout Boom, INC., Sept. 1983, at 46 (stating that the
leveraged buyout "has become a phenomenon, a device whose popularity is attested to by
everything short of buttons and bumper stickers").
5. W.T. Grimm & Company, a Chicago-based merger broker that tracks corporate ac-
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In a typical leveraged buyout, a group of investors joins with the top man-
agement of a company to buy out the public shareholders and gain full own-
ership of the company. A management-investor purchasing group uses the
company's assets and stock as collateral to secure long and medium term
loans, which in turn finance the buyout-hence the name "leveraged
buyout.''6 The money may be borrowed from a bank, a venture capital com-
pany, or a group of investors. The purchasing group, comprised of the cor-
poration's management, either in part or in whole, together with selected
investors are able to purchase a company with a comparatively small per-
sonal financial investment.7 For management, a leveraged buyout offers the
opportunity to own a piece of the company it is currently managing and
thereby an opportunity to control the company's destiny.8 For selected in-
vestors, however, a leveraged buyout offers the opportunity to take calcu-
lated risks on prospective companies with strong established cash flows and
quisitions, indicated that 1983 buyout sales of public companies "going private", most of
which involved leveraged buyouts, totalled $7.1 billion, up tenfold from $636 million in 1979.
Smith, Shareholder Risks in Leveraged Buyouts Ride on Fear of Bankruptcy-Law Filings, Wall
St. J., July 25, 1984, at 10, col. 1. W.T. Grimm & Company further asserted that in the first
three months of 1984, total buyout sales reached $3.5 billion. Leonard Shaykin of Adler &
Shaykin, a partnership formed in 1983 to arrange leveraged buyouts, has predicted that the
number of leveraged buyouts will eventually approach 50% of all corporate acquisitions. Wa-
ters, supra note 4, at 47. William Brian Little, a partner in the leveraged buyout firm of Forst-
mann Little & Company stated that the environment for leveraged buyouts in 1985 is good
because of the sluggish stock market and drop in interest rates, creating a climate congenial to
the technique. Vise, supra note 3, at col. 3.
In the first half of 1985, 20 full-company leveraged buyouts were announced, including that
of Storer Communications, Inc. for $2.51 billion. Williams, Firms Have Two Avenues for Go-
ing Private, Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 1985, at 13, col. 2. In July 1985, Levi Strauss & Co., the
world's largest apparelmaker, announced its plans to "go private" via a leveraged buyout
transaction. Scott, Why More Companies Go Private Via Buy-Outs, Christian Sci. Monitor,
Aug. 16, 1985, at 19, col. 2. Examples of companies that have gone private between 1981 and
1985 via a leveraged buyout include Winchester (1981, marketer of rifles), Converse (1982,
marketer of athletic footwear), Empire (1983, marketer of petroleum gas and equipment), Dr.
Pepper (1984, marketer of soft drinks) and Denny's (1985, marketer of restaurant foods and
service).
6. Brown, Leveraged Buyouts 1983's Rage, Wash. Post, Dec. 7, 1983, at D8, col. 3. See
generally A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 316-17.
7. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 5, at 19, col. 2, wherein Bulent Gultekin, an associate
finance professor at the Wharton School, is quoted, stating that in a leveraged buyout for $100
"you can borrow $99 of that and put up $1 of your own money .... You end up owning the
company-by using other people's money."
8. See id., wherein representatives of two major companies, involved in leveraged buyout
transactions, expressed their desire to control their company's future. Dean Meadors, spokes-
man for Mary Kay Cosmetics, states that being a private company gives "the freedom to make
long-term strategic decisions." Robert D. Haas, president of Levi Strauss & Co., says that
private ownership of a company provides a "way to ensure that the company continues to
respect and implement its corporate values and traditions." Id.
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developed markets.9 In turn, the acquired company usually becomes highly
indebted or leveraged, displaying a dramatic increase in debt on its balance
sheet.'" Ultimately, the debt is repaid with money raised by the company's
operations or by a subsequent sale of its assets."
The proliferation and operation of the leveraged buyout have spawned
questions concerning its fairness to public shareholders.' 2 A leveraged
buyout creates two groups of shareholders. The first, the control group, con-
sists of top management. The other, the outside shareholder group, consists
of the public shareholders who are not members of the management-investor
purchasing group and thereby lack participation in the direct control of the
company. 13 Each group is treated differently. 14 The control group may re-
9. L. Lederman, R. Citron & R. Macris, Leveraged Buyouts-An Update, reprinted in
15th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation 281, 283 (held on Nov. 10-12, 1983 in New
York, New York).
10. Debt-to-equity ratios, which are calculated by dividing the total liabilities of a corpo-
ration by its total equities, have been as high as 12-to-I for the leveraged buyout. L. Leder-
man, R. Citron & R. Macris, supra note 9, at 284. Compare this figure to a typical public
company's financing that rarely exceeds a debt-to-equity ratio of three-to-one. Id. at 291. For
example, a public company with $100 million of debt and $900 million of equity undergoing a
leveraged buyout transaction is transformed by that transaction into "a private company with
$900 million of debt and $100 million of capital." Rohatyn, On a Buyout Binge and a Take-
over Tear, Wall St. J., May 18, 1984, at 26, col. 4. As an example of a 1985 highly leveraged
deal, Levi Strauss & Co. would be required to spend $150 million in interest for each of five
years-about 40% of operating profits. Scott, supra note 5, at col. 2. Corporate assets, how-
ever, are generally intended to "provide a base for innovation, expansion, modernization and
diversification." Thomas, supra note 4, at cols. 2-3.
11. Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1984, at 2, col. 2.
12. See, e.g., B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 1 (discussing the leveraged buyout of one
company, Stokely Van-Camp, Inc.). The outside shareholders of Stokely were offered a
buyout price of $55 per share based on the financial judgment of an investment banking firm.
Management presented and recommended the price to the shareholders as "fair and attrac-
tive." When outside companies heard of this transaction, however, they offered higher prices
than that of management. One company, Pillsbury, made a cash tender offer of $62 per share
and a few weeks later, another company, Quaker Oats, surpassed Pillsbury with a successful
bid of $77 per share. Notably, the Quaker Oats offer could not be blocked by the Stokely
management group because it controlled only 22% of the outstanding stock, an insufficient
amount to control the terms of the buyout. If, however, the management group had controlled
a majority of the outstanding shares, then the Stokely shareholders may not have been so
fortunate as to receive $77 per share-a 40% increase-because the management would have a
control block, enabling it to control the outcome of the buyout. Id.
Longstreth cited another example of a buyout in which the minority shareholders were pow-
erless. In a particular company (unnamed), the minority acted upon the news of a low price
buyout proposal by the majority management shareholders by attempting to attract a higher
bid from a third-party. They were unsuccessful, however, because the management majority
was unwilling to sell out to outside parties. Id. at 2.
13. In the "going private" merger cases that are discussed in this Comment, the term
'minority group" depicts this outside group of shareholders. In the discussion of leveraged
buyouts, however, "outside shareholder group" or "outside shareholders" is used instead of
minority group because the outside shareholder group may conceivably hold a majority of the
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ceive preferential treatment since it voluntarily retains an equity interest in
the company, while the outside shareholder group may receive disadvanta-
geous treatment because it involuntarily loses participation in the future
profits of the company. The effective arms-length bargaining that accompa-
nies most intercorporate transactions is often absent from this transaction.'5
Indeed, the control group enjoys the opportunity to buy back and thereby
take the acquired company private at a bargain price because the stock
prices of the target companies are often "far below the value of their as-
sets." 16 Moreover, the control group does not share with the outside group
the opportunity to be the "sole owners of a cash machine." 7 Because the
usual corporate conduct of focusing on the best interests of all shareholders
is not readily applicable to the leveraged buyout transaction, such a transac-
tion "present[s] the danger that the control group will, consciously or un-
consciously, treat itself more favorably" than the outside shareholder
group."8 These benefits and opportunities are not generally available to the
company's public shareholders. It is not surprising, then, that some outside
group shareholders have become disgruntled and have voiced their disap-
proval of proposed leveraged buyouts.' 9
Because of the relative novelty of the leveraged buyout transaction,
neither state case law nor the federal securities laws have sufficiently devel-
oped to regulate adequately the fairness of this business phenomenon.
Therefore, existing case law and securities laws that relate to this type of
transaction will be examined and an analogy will be drawn to the leveraged
buyout. Primarily, the relevant law is in the area of "going private" merger
transactions with its attendant "fiduciary duty of fair dealing and fair price,"
outstanding shares. Further, in this discussion, "control group" may be used interchangeably
with management-investor purchasing group.
14. A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 318. In a nonleveraged buyout
transaction, for example, where all the shareholders may receive continued equity in the corpo-
ration on a pro rata basis, then no disparate treatment among the shareholders seemingly
exists. Id.
15. Id.
16. Williams, supra note 5, at 18, col. 2; Scott, supra note 5, at 19, col. 2.
17. Brody, A Leveraged Buyout Touches Off A Bitter Dispute, Barrons, Sept. 19, 1983, at
15, col. 1.
18. A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 318.
19. See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Hennesey v. North American Royalties, Inc., Civ. No. 83-
4233 (E.D. La. filed Aug. 23, 1983), wherein an outside shareholder, Hennesey, averred that
the offered price in this buyout
is woefully inadequate and unfair, does not represent the full value of the shares of
NAR, is manipulative of the market price of the shares of NAR, represents an at-
tempt by the majority shareholders of NAR to "freeze out" the minority stockhold-
ers of NAR, does not benefit NAR in any way, and operates as a fraud on the
minority stockholders of NAR.
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"disclosure," and "business purpose" standards.2" The federal securities
laws regulate disclosure in "going private" transactions and state case law
regulates matters of fiduciary duty, including fair dealing, fair price, and
business purpose. Because the state of Delaware is widely considered to be
the harbinger of trends in corporate law,2 1 Delaware law will be examined in
determining the appropriate degree of fairness and business purpose to be
applied to leveraged buyouts.
This Comment will address whether the public shareholder is treated
fairly in the leveraged buyout transaction.22 It will first examine the relevant
Delaware case law and federal securities laws that pertain to this type of
transaction.23 Furthermore, it will discuss fairness between the control
group and the outside shareholder group in terms of arranging deals and
setting prices. The Comment will also explore the need for the Securities
20. Although the concepts addressed in this Comment may also apply to "going private"
transactions in a general sense, this Comment singularly discusses the leveraged buyout as the
transaction most in need of specialized treatment because self-dealing becomes a primary con-
cern in this type of transaction.
21. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), deciding the rights of
cashed-out shareholders in a merger context, which is expected to extend to the other states.
See L. Lederman, R. Citron & R. Macris, supra note 9, at 300 ("We believe that the key thrust
of Weinberger, appraisal as the remedy to the exclusion of damages or recission [sic] . . . will
find its way into all the cases where mergers are challenged.").
In the same vein, Delaware is recognized for its extensive body of fiduciary law. See, e.g.,
Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883,
889 (1976). He stated that
[a] large portion of all corporate litigation is conducted in Delaware because of the
disproportionate number of publicly held corporations chartered there. Not even the
populous financial centers of New York, Illinois and California have given rise to a
body of fiduciary law as extensive as that which Delaware has accumulated.
Id. Adoption of Delaware's fiduciary duty provisions by other states is commonplace. See,
e.g., Dower v. Mosser Indus., 648 F.2d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 1981) (example of a federal court
sitting in Pennsylvania looking to Delaware case law for guidance in determining a standard
for fundamental fairness in a merger transaction).
It is relevant to note, however, that
[t]he State of Delaware has a long history as the domicile of nationally known corpo-
rations, and has traditionally provided a favorable climate for corporations. The offi-
cial attitude of the Legislature and administrative officers of Delaware has
consistently been one of sympathetic understanding of the problems of the corporate
organization.
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS, 31 n.40 (3d ed. 1983) (quoting E.
FOLK, THE RED BOOK DIGEST OF THE NEW DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW-1967, at 1
(45th ed. 1968)).
22. This Comment will confine its discussion to buyouts of public companies or their
subsidiaries or divisions by a management-investor group. The result is the elimination of the
public shareholders' interest in the companies. When a publicly-held company goes private in
this type of transaction it will in most instances be subject to the requirements of the Securities
and Exchange Commission's Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985), to be discussed infra.
23. See infra notes 32-202 and accompanying text.
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and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) to require a proper busi-
ness purpose before control groups may implement this type of transaction.
Finally, this Comment will suggest that the public shareholder in a leveraged
buyout transaction is dealing from a disadvantaged position within the cor-
poration in which he holds a financial interest. Because of the inequality
between the control group and the outside group and the conflicts of interest
inherent in this transaction, the outside shareholder remains ever vulnerable
to unfair treatment. Therefore, this Comment will conclude with a proposal
calling for a review of "entire fairness" in the leveraged buyout transaction
consisting of a scrutiny of three elements: fair dealing (which includes full
disclosure), fair price, and a valid business purpose. This proposal is in-
tended to increase the protection afforded the public shareholder, confronted
with the leveraged buyout transaction, and concomitantly to enhance the
image of the American corporation.
I. DELAWARE CASE LAW AND FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
ADDRESSING THE LEVERAGED BUYOUT TRANSACTION
Although the federal courts have occasionally addressed the issue of gen-
eral fiduciary duty between the controlling shareholder and the outside
shareholder, they have firmly based their opinions in state common law prin-
ciples.24 Those federal cases that are not firmly grounded in state common
law principles nonetheless have looked to state law for guidance, and where
state precedents have not been directly on point, they have speculated a
given result.2" In situations where complaints against the implementation of
"going private" merger transactions have been brought into federal courts,
the complaints routinely have been examined both at the federal level, via
the federal securities laws, and at the state level under case law, discussing
the general fiduciary duty of fairness standards.2 6 Whatever the source of
24. See, e.g., Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying Delaware state law
and finding that it did not permit a merger without a valid business purpose); Bryan v. Brock
& Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974) (looking to Georgia
state law and finding that it did not authorize a merger without a valid business purpose).
However, the continued validity of the Coleman decision may be in doubt as a result of Dela-
ware's Weinberger decision, 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983), holding that a valid business pur-
pose would no longer be required when implementing a merger transaction in Delaware. See
infra notes 151-55.
25. See, e.g., Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973) (wherein the New York fed-
eral court speculated that New York state courts would look to Florida law to find a rule for
its decision and then decided that Florida courts would likely impose liability upon a certain
corporation's tippees).
26. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Susman v. Lincoln American
Corp., 578 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (minority shareholders challenging mandatory cash-
out merger under Securities and Exchange Act § 10(b) and rule lob-5 thereunder for alleged
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the holding, however, the tenor of federal decisions is unmistakable in up-
holding the importance of requiring a general fiduciary duty of fair dealing
by those in control of a corporation." Therefore, until federal case law ex-
plicitly sets independent standards for a general fiduciary duty of fair deal-
ing, state law continues to control this issue.2" For this reason, this
Comment will consider relevant Delaware case law.
A. Extending Delaware's General Fiduciary Duty of Fair Dealing and
Fair Price and Delaware's Business Purpose Element to "Going
Private" Transactions
The Delaware courts have struggled with establishing an appropriate stan-
dard of "entire fairness" in the context of a "going private" merger transac-
tion because they have been uncertain as to whether the standard should
include some or all of the following elements: fair dealing, fair price, disclo-
sure, and business purpose. Whether to include a "valid business purpose"
in the group of elements has been a subject of particular uncertainty. Ac-
misrepresentation and nondisclosure, and under Delaware law for breach of fiduciary duty of
fairness).
27. Several Supreme Court decisions evidence the judicial intent to establish federal fidu-
ciary standards for those in control of a corporation. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250
U.S. 483, 487 (1919) (wherein the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he rule of corporation law
and of equity invoked is well settled and has been often applied."). The Court further stated
that "[t]he majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary rela-
tion toward the minority, as much so as the corporation itself or its officers and directors." Id.
at 487-88; see also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) (where the Supreme Court upheld the
denial of a bankruptcy claim of a controlling shareholder who violated his fiduciary duty to the
other shareholders). The Court stated that
[a] director is a fiduciary. . . . So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group
of stockholders. . . . Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous
scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is
challenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to prove good faith
of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the
corporation and those interested therein.
Id. at 306 (citations omitted). Cf E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46
(1977) (where the Court recognized the intent of Congress to extend fiduciary standards to
mergers of investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (recognizing the intent of Congress to ex-
tend fiduciary standards to investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
For other federal cases addressing the "fairness to minority shareholders," see Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir.
1947). (recognizing that directors of a corporation are required to treat fairly each class of
stock and holding that the directors violated a duty owed to the minority shareholders when
they caused the corporation to call a convertible participating preferred security, such that
only the majority shareholder could realize the large appreciation in value of the inventory).
28. For a general discussion of the regulation of corporate management, see Symposium-
An In-Depth Analysis of the Federal and State Roles in Regulating Corporate Management, 31
Bus. LAW. (Special Issue, Feb. 1976).
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cordingly, the business purpose element needs to be examined closely and
independently of the other elements even though it emerges in many of the
same cases that discuss the other three elements. Therefore, this Comment
will first examine those cases in the context of fiduciary duty of fair dealing
and fair price to establish an "entire fairness" standard. The same cases will
then be reexamined in a separate section to establish a business purpose ele-
ment that might be included in the "entire fairness" standard.
1. The Evolution of Delaware's Fiduciary Duty of Fairness
in Corporate Transactions
Under Delaware case law, corporate officers and directors owe a general
fiduciary duty of honesty, good faith, and diligence" to their corporation
and its outside shareholders. These fiduciary duty principles have been con-
strued by the courts to prevent the control group from manipulating the
corporate machinery so as to injure the outside shareholder group.3" Re-
peatedly, these traditional fiduciary duty principles have appeared in Dela-
ware cases not involving "going private" transactions.3" Three such cases
are discussed below and demonstrate corporate transactions that directly af-
fect the interests of outside shareholders but are permissible so long as the
transaction does not violate Delaware's attendant fiduciary duty principles
of honesty, good faith, and diligence. Application of these principles to rela-
tions between the control group and the outside shareholder group is justi-
fied to prevent the control group from manipulating the corporate
machinery and injuring the outside shareholder group.
In 1923, the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed the standard of fidu-
ciary care owed by the majority shareholders to the minority shareholders in
Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America.32 The court
considered whether the majority shareholders' sale of the corporate assets
was permissible merely because it complied with Delaware statutory require-
ments for a sale of assets and determined that it was not. The control group
of Steel & Tube Company entered into negotiations to sell to Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Company all its property, assets, and goodwill. The control
group was dominated by holders of the preferred stock, who stood to benefit
29. See generally Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939); infra notes 38-43 and accom-
panying text.
30. Rothschild, Going Private, Singer, and Rule 13e-3, 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 195, 200 (1979)
(examining Delaware corporation law and finding that its fiduciary duties have been specifi-
cally construed to prevent injury to minority shareholders through management's manipula-
tion of corporate machinery).
31. See infra notes 32-50 and accompanying text.
32. 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 486 (1923).
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most by the proposed sale. Also, the majority shareholders, who voted for
the sale, would receive a greater return on their common shares than the
minority shareholders, who voted against the proposed sale.33 A corporate
minority shareholder attacked the transaction on the grounds that, although
legal, the sale was unfair to the minority shareholder group because of its
inequitable terms. The court acknowledged that the relevant statute ap-
peared to give the majority shareholders the exclusive right to sell the as-
sets,34 but warned that this right could be exercised only upon terms and
conditions that considered the best interests of the corporation.35 These
terms included such considerations as the price to be paid, the terms of
credit, if any, and the manner of payment.36 The court indicated that it
would look beyond the mere statutory requirements for a sale of corporate
assets and would require the control group to exercise its fiduciary duty of
fair dealing, by considering the best interests of the corporation.
3 7
The concern for fiduciary duty principles underlying the Allied Chemical
case was again addressed in Guth v. Loft, Inc. 38 In Guth, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that a corporate officer in a candy and beverage manu-
facturing company who had earned profits from his interest in the affairs of a
competing business had breached his fiduciary duty. 39 The corporate officer
owed to the candy and beverage company a duty of loyalty and good faith.
He breached this duty by organizing another company, with money belong-
ing to the original company, to manufacture a competing, similar beverage
syrup.' The court stated that a corporate officer could engage in competi-
tive independent businesses only if he did not violate any moral or legal duty
arising out of the fiduciary relationship that existed between himself and the
corporation of which he was an officer.41 The court stated that the require-
ment of undivided loyalty to the corporation demands that "there shall be
no conflict between duty and self-interest, ' 42 and that officers and directors
33. Id. at 7-8, 120 A. at 489.
34. Id. at 11-12, 120A. at 491.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 147 A. 257 (1929) (applying
identical Delaware fiduciary principles in a similar case involving the sale of corporate assets
by the majority).
37. Allied, 14 Del. Ch. at 18-19, 120 A. at 494.
38. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
39. Id. at 511.
40. Id. at 507.
41. Id. at 514.
42. Id. at 510. The Guth court based the corporate officers' fiduciary duty on long estab-
lished public policy. The court stated that
[p]ublic policy, existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge
of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corpo-
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must exercise their utmost good faith in fulfilling their fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its public shareholders.4 3 Guth established the principle
that neither management nor directors may shirk their general fiduciary
duty and use their corporate power solely for their individual advantage if to
do so would be detrimental to their public shareholders.
In 1952, minority shareholders of a hotel corporation brought an action to
enjoin an unwanted merger of their corporation into the parent corporation
on the grounds that the merger was a breach by the parent corporation of its
general fiduciary duty. The Delaware Court of Chancery, in Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp.,' considered whether the transaction was a breach of
fiduciary duty owed to the minority shareholders by the parent corporation
and found that it was not. The minority shareholders of Mayflower Hotel
Corporation asserted that the merger plan was both fraudulent and unfair to
them because the plan was not approved by a quorum of disinterested direc-
tors at the meeting of the Mayflower board.45 The court reasoned, however,
that the transaction was neither fraudulent nor unfair to the minority be-
cause each shareholder received equity in the merged corporation on a
share-for-share basis.46 In affirming the order of the Court of Chancery, the
Delaware Supreme Court nonetheless recognized the unflinching fiduciary
duty of fair dealing required of the dominant parent corporation, standing as
controlling shareholder on both sides of the merger transaction.47 It there-
fore placed the burden on the controlling shareholder to clearly and unques-
tionably demonstrate the "entire fairness" of the merger transaction, taking
into consideration all pertinent factors.48 It thus became established Dela-
ware law that controlling or majority shareholders owe to the minority
shareholders of that corporation a fiduciary obligation of "entire fairness" in
rate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance
of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation commit-
ted to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to
the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability
might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exer-
cise of its powers.
Id.
43. Id. at 511. Cf Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. at 311 (stating that a corporate officer with a
fiduciary duty could not use his power for personal gains and to the detriment of the corpora-
tion's creditors and shareholders, no matter how absolute that power may be and no matter
how scrupulously he satisfies technical requirements).
44. 33 Del. Ch. 20, 89 A.2d 862 (1952).
45. Id. at 24-25, 89 A.2d at 864-65.
46. Id. at 23, 89 A.2d at 864.
47. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (1952).
48. Id. Although the court did not expand on the components of "entire fairness," it
emphasized a standard, which was developed in the Singer trilogy and Weinberger. See infra
notes 53-104.
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dealing with the minority shareholders' property interests during a corporate
merger transaction.4 9
These cases permit corporate transactions directly affecting the property
interests of the corporation's minority shareholders, unless the transactions
violate Delaware's attendant fiduciary duty standards. They echo the tradi-
tional concern for breaches of the control group's fiduciary duty of fair deal-
ing to the corporation and its outside shareholder group. Although none of
these cases involved a "going private" transaction, it was against the back-
drop of these cases that Singer v. Magnavox Co. 50 and its progeny were con-
sidered by the Delaware Supreme Court. Through the case law following
Singer and successive cases considering the issue of "going private" in the
context of a merger transaction, the Delaware courts have established a stan-
dard of "entire fairness" that is currently considered in leveraged buyouts."
2. Delaware's Fiduciary Duty of Fair Dealing and Fair Price in the
"Going Private" Merger Context
Singer v. Magnavox Co. is the first of four important Delaware cases ex-
amining the fiduciary duty principles involved in a "going private" merger
transaction. As previously stated, a "going private" transaction occurs
when a corporation removes its publicly-traded shares from the market and
ceases to file public company reports under the federal securities laws. The
most important consideration in Singer was the fiduciary obligation owed by
majority shareholders, who had control of the corporation, to the minority
shareholders. The minority shareholders of Magnavox were subjected to a
long-form cash merger52 orchestrated by the majority. The majority had
previously acquired 84.1% of the shares of Magnavox following a tender
49. 33 Del. Ch. at 298, 93 A.2d at 109-10. See Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del.
Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (1953) (recognizing minority shareholder's fiduciary rights in statutorily
authorized issuance of stock transaction that was allegedly done to impair the minority share-
holder's interest and to oust him from the corporation upon the management's own terms).
50. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983). For a general discussion giving historical precedence to Singer, see Rothschild, supra
note 30.
51. L. Lederman, R. Citron & R. Macris, supra note 9, at 299.
52. The long-form merger is the absorption of one company by another. The latter retains
its own name and identity and acquires the liabilities, assets, franchises, and powers of the
former. The absorbed company ceases to exist as a separate business entity and the companies
become united in interest. 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPO-
RATIONS § 7041 (rev. perm. ed. 1983). See, e.g., Havender v. Federal United Corp., 23 Del.
Ch. 104, 2 A.2d 143 (1938) (where two corporations, each with its distinct body of sharehold-
ers, desired to combine their liabilities and assets and thereafter had their two corporations
operated and managed as one). A second form of merger, the "short-form" merger is dis-
cussed infra at note 76.
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offer,5 3 thereby assuring passage of the subsequently proposed long-form
cash merger. In the Court of Chancery, the minority charged that the
buyout was fraudulent because the majority had failed to articulate a valid
business purpose for seeking the shares.54 Also, the minority shareholders
contended that the offered buyout price of nine dollars per share was grossly
inadequate,55 thereby enabling the controlling shareholders of Magnavox to
attain easily sole ownership. Further, the minority alleged that the majority
had breached its fiduciary duty to the minority by recommending approval
of the merger at a cash price per share that it knew to be grossly inadequate
and by ignoring the minority's desire to retain its equity interest in
Magnavox. Conversely, the majority acknowledged its fiduciary duty to the
minority, but contended that the duty did not require a business purpose in
order to implement a cash-out merger.56 The Court of Chancery granted the
majority shareholders' motion to dismiss and held that the merger was not
fraudulent merely because it was orchestrated solely to eliminate the
Magnavox minority shareholders. The court further stated that those share-
holders dissatisfied with the cash-out price could seek an appraisal remedy.57
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed.5 8 Focusing on the fiduciary re-
sponsibility of fairness owed by majority shareholders to the minority share-
holders, the court stated that it would "not be indifferent" to a proposed
cash-out merger of the minority without a business purpose.5 9 It held that a
proposed merger, which would effectively eliminate the minority, needed a
legitimate, asserted business purpose.' The question of what constituted a
legitimate business purpose was left undecided.6 Additionally, the pro-
53. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 971 (Del. 1977).
54. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1353 (Del. Ch. 1976), aft'd in part and rev'd
in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
55. 367 A.2d at 1353.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1362. The dissatisfied shareholder's appraisal remedy is a statutory creation
enabling shareholders to seek valuation of fheir equity shares by independent expert opinion
rather than current market figures. The purpose of these statutes is to protect the dissenting
shareholder's property rights from possibly adverse transactions by majority shareholders.
12B W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5906.1 (rev.
perm. ed. 1983).
58. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980.
59. Singer, 380 A.2d at 979. But see Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187
A.2d 78 (1962) (standing for proposition that the purpose of a merger or the absence thereof is
irrelevant for judicial purposes).
60. Singer, 380 A.2d at 978-79. See Rothschild, supra note 30, at 207 n.30 (stating that
the Delaware Supreme Court's "rejection of the defendant's appraisal argument served to fo-
cus attention on one aspect of going private transactions that is often overlooked, namely, the
stockholder's right in the form of his investment and not merely its value") (citing Singer, 380
A.2d at 977-78).
61. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980 n.11. For a thorough discussion of Delaware's business pur-
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posed merger would have to meet the standard of "entire fairness," origi-
nally articulated in Sterling, which comprises a showing of fairness by the
majority shareholders and an establishment of a business purpose for the
transaction other than the elimination of the minority shareholders.62 The
Singer court categorically stated that fiduciary principles of Delaware law
apply to mergers and that redress is available to cashed-out minority share-
holders under state law, even though the transaction may be accompanied
by complete disclosure.6 3 Thus, Singer specifically extended the controlling
shareholders' general fiduciary duty of "honesty, loyalty, good faith and fair-
ness"' (including fair price) to the "going private" aspect of a long-form
merger transaction.
In a second Delaware "going private" merger case, Tanzer v. International
General Industries, 65 the Delaware Supreme Court considered the question
left unanswered in Singer, that is, whether a long-form merger made primar-
ily to advance the business purpose of the majority shareholders violated the
fiduciary duty owed to the minority shareholders. 66 The court found that
the fiduciary duty owed to the minority shareholders by the majority was not
violated in instances where the merger was initiated to advance a bona fide
purpose of the majority.6 7 Tanzer involved a merger between two subsidiar-
ies of a common parent corporation in which shareholders holding a 19%
interest in one of the subsidiaries were bought out for cash. The uncontested
purpose of the merger was the desire of the parent corporation to merge its
majority-owned subsidiary into the parent corporation so that the assets of
the subsidiary would be available to facilitate long-term debt financing by
the parent corporation. The bought-out minority sought to enjoin the
merger, alleging that the sole purpose of the merger was to serve only the
interests of the majority shareholders. The majority argued, however, that
pose requirement in the "going private" context, see infra notes 127-57 and accompanying
text.
62. Id. at 976. See Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 681 (Del. Ch. 1969), affd, 278
A.2d 467 (Del. 1970) (recognizing that an individual controlling both corporations in a merger
transaction owed a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders requiring treatment in an "en-
tirely fair manner"); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch.
1968) (restricting parent corporation from taking unfair advantage in a merger of its subsidiary
and utilizing an inherent fairness test to examine the conduct of the parent).
63. Singer, 380 A.2d at 977-78. See Rothschild, supra note 30, at 208.
64. Singer, 380 A.2d at 977. Other Delaware cases applying the fiduciary doctrine include
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971); Kaplan v. Fenton, 278 A.2d 834 (Del.
1971); Dolese Bros. v. Brown, 39 Del. Ch. 1, 157 A.2d 784 (1960).
65. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983).
66. Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1122.
67. Id. at 1124.
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no violation of fiduciary duty occurred 68 because the merger was completed
for a valid business purpose. Delaware's Court of Chancery accepted the
majority's purpose as nonviolative of the minority shareholders' fiduciary
rights. The court, therefore, denied the minority's application for a prelimi-
69nary injunction.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.70 The court noted that among the
general rights of a corporate shareholder is a right to vote in his or her own
interest.7" This right, however, is limited by any fiduciary duty owed to
other shareholders.72 Therefore, the court reasoned that a parent corpora-
tion owning a majority of its subsidiary's stock had a right to consider a
merger for its own corporate purpose, subject, however, to its fiduciary duty
of fair dealing owed to the minority. This corporate purpose could not in-
clude ridding the corporation of unwanted shareholders, expressly prohib-
ited by the Singer decision. In this context, the court made clear that the
majority shareholder, in dealing with a subsidiary, must not hide its true
objective of ridding itself of unwanted minority shareholders in the subsidi-
ary.7 3 Moreover, the majority "must be prepared to show that it has met" a
standard of "entire fairness" to the minority7" as imposed by both Singer
and Sterling, which consists of fair dealing, fair price and a valid business
purpose. Extending this language to the Tanzer situation, the court found a
valid purpose for the merger, overriding the minority's desire to retain its
equity interest in the subsidiary corporation.7 5
Thus, after Singer and Tanzer, the law of fiduciary duty, in the "going
private" merger context, required the majority shareholders to meet a stan-
dard of "entire fairness" in all aspects of the transaction. Although, as was
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1122.
70. Id. at 1125.
71. Id. at 1123.
72. Id. at 1124. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling,
29 Del. Ch. 610, 622, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (1947) (a shareholder of a corporation may liberally
vote his shares according to whim or caprice, so long as he does not violate any duty to other
shareholders); Heil v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 17 Del. Ch. 214, 151 A. 303, 304 (1930)
(shareholders have a right to vote for personal profit motives, so long as no advantage is ob-
tained at the expense of other shareholders); Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of
Am., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 16-17, 120 A. 486, 493 (1923) (subject to the fairness rule, majority share-
holders have a right to dispose of assets of profitable business over objection of minority
shareholders).
73. Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1124.
74. Id. The standard of "entire fairness" to the minority calls for a demonstration of
fairness by the majority and the establishment of a business purpose for the transaction that is
something other than the elimination of the minority shareholders. See supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
75. Id. at 1125.
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demonstrated in Tanzer, the Delaware Supreme Court would permit a
merger that benefitted the majority shareholders and resulted in the cash-out
of minority shareholders, such transactions would be carefully scrutinized.
However, Singer and Tanzer addressed the fiduciary duty issue only in the
context of long-form mergers, leaving open the question of whether the same
principles applied to short-form mergers."6
The Delaware Supreme Court considered the applicability of Singer and
Tanzer to short-form mergers in yet another "going private" merger case,
Roland International Corp. v. Naijar. "7 In Roland, the majority sharehold-
ers attempted a cash buyout of the minority shareholders through use of a
short-form merger.7' A minority shareholder of Roland International Cor-
poration brought a class action against the corporation for money damages
that allegedly occurred from a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the minority
shareholder. 79 The majority, owning 97.6% of the outstanding shares of the
Roland Corporation, conceded in the Court of Chancery that the sole pur-
pose of implementing the merger was to eliminate the minority from further
equity participation so that the majority shareholders could gain full owner-
ship of the corporation.80 The Court of Chancery denied the majority's mo-
tion to dismiss this action because it found that Singer supported the
minority's proposition that the principles of fiduciary duty applied in a
short-form merger.8 ' The majority shareholders appealed.
The Delaware Supreme Court asserted that the primary focus of Singer
and Tanzer was the enforcement of a corporate fiduciary duty. In extending
these fiduciary principles owed by the majority shareholders to the minority
shareholders in a short-form merger, the court affirmed the decision of the
lower court. The court stated that the majority shareholders of a corpora-
tion owe a fiduciary duty of fair dealing and fair price to the minority be-
76. A short-form merger is one in which the parent corporation owns substantially all of
the shares (e.g., 90% ownership required) of the subsidiary corporation and is therefore given
a means of eliminating the minority shareholders' interest in the corporation upon approval of
the parent corporation's board of directors and without the approval of the shareholders of
either corporation. The result is a merger that is less expensive and time consuming than the
normal long-form merger, supra note 52. 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7046.1 (rev. perm. ed. 1983). See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BusI-
NESS CORP. ACT § 11.04 (1984) which authorizes the merger of a 90% owned subsidiary into
the parent corporation without a vote of the shareholders. A shareholder vote is required,
however, in a long-form merger. See supra note 52.
77. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983).
78. See supra note 76.
79. Najjar v. Roland Int'l Corp., 387 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1978).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 711-13.
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cause the majority has the power to control the destiny and property of the
corporation.82 The court declared that the fiduciary duty owed by the ma-
jority shareholders would not be diminished merely because it held a major-
ity of the corporation's shares.83
The majority argued that its actions did not ignore its fiduciary duty to the
minority. Because of the high percentage of stock it owned, the majority
claimed that the short-form merger, created specifically to ease mergers for
high-percentage owners, presumed a proper business purpose.84 Of equal
importance, the majority contended, was the minority's right to seek the
remedy of appraisal if it was dissatisfied with the offered price per share.85
The court rejected both of these arguments and reaffirmed that a fiduciary
duty arises from long-standing principles of equity, independent of the type
of merger involved. In rejecting the appraisal remedy as inadequate, the
court noted that the timing of the cash-out merger remained entirely within
the control of the majority, and that the majority had the power to arrange
the cash-out merger at a time when the state of the market and the elements
of appraisal were most favorable to it.86 Therefore, the court concluded that
the short-cut afforded the majority by the short-form merger could not be
used to "short-circuit" the fiduciary duty it owed to the minority.87
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 8 8 is the final of the four Delaware merger cases
setting standards of fiduciary care for the "going private" transaction. The
court's decision in this case overruled the holdings of Singer, Tanzer, and
Roland, thus marking a return to the pre-Singer policy of not requiring a
business purpose for the transaction and relegating the complaining share-
82. Roland, 407 A.2d at 1035.
83. Id. at 1036. In addressing the short-form merger, the court stated that:
[We find nothing magic about a 90% ownership of outstanding shares which would
eliminate the fiduciary duty owed by the majority to the minority. The duty existed
in Singer, when the parent corporation owned about 84% of the target corporation's
stock. Clearly, the same rule would have applied if the parent had held 89% of the
shares. . . . In fact, the need to recognize and enforce such equitable principles is
probably greater when the size of the minority is smaller.
Id.
84. Id. at 1035-36. The majority shareholders contended that the Delaware short-form
merger statute simplified the steps necessary to effect a short-form merger from those required
to effect a long-form merger, in order to give the parent corporation some control as to the
timing of the merger and some certainty as to its fruition. Id. The majority conceded, how-
ever, that a "proper purpose (for the merger] would not be conclusively presumed if the major-
ity had attained 90% ownership by illegal or fraudulent means." Id. at 1036 n.7.
85. Id. at 1035.
86. Id. at 1034.
87. Id. at 1036. See generally Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate
Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978) for a pragmatic approach that would set the standard of
review of fiduciary duties according to the type of merger involved.
88. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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holders to appraisal remedy, unless that remedy is rendered inadequate.89
In this controlling case, the majority shareholders of a corporate subsidiary
cashed-out the minority shareholders. The parent majority owned 50.5% of
the outstanding shares and the minority owned the remainder. The minority
attacked the validity of the transaction because a feasibility study prepared
by two of the subsidiary's directors, who were also directors of the parent
corporation, recommended an offering price per share that was higher than
the price publicly offered to the minority.9" The feasibility study had been
made concerning the possible acquisition of UOP's 49.5% outstanding
shares from the minority. The study concluded that the price of $24 per
share was a good investment for the parent majority. However, only $21 per
share was offered to the minority.9' The higher price suggested by the feasi-
bility study was not disclosed to the subsidiary's outside directors nor to its
minority shareholders prior to their vote of approval for the merger. 92 In
deciding the case, the Court of Chancery reexamined the issue of fiduciary
duty of fairness owed to the cashed-out minority by the majority.
Following the principles set forth in the Singer trilogy, the Delaware
lower court placed the burden on the management group to establish the
transaction's "entire fairness" to the minority stockholders, sufficient to pass
close scrutiny by the courts. 93 The "entire fairness" test included four fac-
tors for the court to consider: a) the fiduciary duties of the subsidiary com-
pany's directors in approving the "going private" merger transaction; b) the
adequacy of the price paid to the cashed-out minority shareholders; c) the
adequacy and accuracy of information disclosure by the subsidiary or major-
ity shareholders to the minority shareholders; and d) the purpose of the "go-
ing private" merger transaction.94 Applying these factors to the Weinberger
facts, the Court of Chancery found that the subsidiary's board of directors
did not breach their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders in approving
the "going private" merger transaction, and that there was no failure by the
subsidiary or majority shareholders to disclose pertinent information to the
minority shareholders. Moreover, the Court of Chancery found that there
was a proper purpose for the "going private" merger transaction and that
the price offered to the minority shareholders was fair.9 5
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded, requiring manage-
89. Id. at 715.
90. Id. at 707.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1342-46 (Del. Ch. 1981), afj'd mem., 497
A.2d 792 (Del. 1985).
94. 426 A.2d at 1345-56.
95. Id.
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ment to show that the transaction was fair to the minority shareholders.
The court stated, however, that the burden may shift to the minority share-
holders to prove "specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other items of
misconduct" when alleging unfairness by the majority shareholders. 96 If the
minority shareholders are unable to prove any fraud or misconduct by the
majority shareholders, then the minority shareholders would be relegated to
an appraisal proceeding as their sole means of remedy. 97 Rescission or dam-
ages would no longer be available remedies, unless the minority shareholders
could demonstrate a situation where appraisal is rendered inadequate relief.
In its examination of fairness of the transaction, the court stated that fair-
ness consists of two elements: fair dealing and fair price. The court turned
first to fair dealing. It examined the manner in which the "going private"
merger transaction was initiated, structured, and disclosed to the outside
directors and minority shareholders. It observed that the merger was en-
tirely initiated and structured without the benefit of independent, arms-
length negotiations, which could have helped in assuring a certain degree of
fairness to the minority shareholders. Moreover, material information used
to determine a fair price for the shares was not disclosed to the outside direc-
tors and minority shareholders.9 8 Given these facts, the court stated that the
merger transaction did not satisfy any reasonable concept of fair dealing.9 9
Thus, the transaction violated the first element of the court's fairness
examination.
Next, the court turned to fair price. Citing Tri-Continental Corp. v. Bat-
tye, 100 the court noted that fair price should require a consideration of "all
relevant factors" pertaining to the value of a company.'' It was at this
stage in the court's analysis that it recommended appraisal proceeding as the
96. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
97. Id. at 715.
98. Id. at 711-12.
99. Id. at 712.
100. 31 Del. Ch. 523, 526, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (1950) ("The basic concept of value under the
appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken
from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern.").
101. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713. The court looked to the 1981 amendment to section
262 of the Delaware Code that called for the court to consider "all relevant factors." Id. The
court stated that pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1981) the Court of Chancery:
shall appraise the shares, determining their fair value exclusive of any element of
value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger, together with a
fair rate of interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair
value. In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant
factors . ...
Id. (emphasis added by the Weinberger court). The court then interpreted the legislative intent
of this section of the Delaware Code to allow full compensation to shareholders for whatever
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basic remedy available to cashed-out shareholders."0 2 The court acknowl-
edged, however, that the appraisal remedy may be inadequate in cases in-
volving fraud, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and
palpable overreaching. Turning to the feasibility study, which indicated that
an offering price of up to $24 per share would be reasonable, the court deter-
mined that the actual offered price of $21 per share could not be held fair to
the minority shareholders.' 0 3 Thus, the transaction failed to meet the sec-
ond element of the court's fairness test and the case was therefore remanded
to the Court of Chancery for further proceedings.' °4
In the above four cases, the courts applied the fiduciary duty of fair deal-
ing and fair price to the "going private" merger transaction. Difficulties
arise, however, when considering whether to require inclusion of a business
purpose element in the test of "entire fairness" of "going private" mergers.
The Delaware courts have been ambivalent on this issue. Thus, the develop-
ment of the business purpose element, as one consideration of the "entire
fairness" test, must be reviewed to determine its status in the fairness analy-
sis of leveraged buyouts. The Singer trilogy and Weinberger cases will be
reexamined from this perspective. However, another case, Rabkin v. Philip
A. Hunt Corp., 105 will be examined first to illustrate Delaware's most recent
position on Weinberger's appraisal remedy.
a. Rabkin Enables Delaware's Supreme Court to Reconsider
Weinberger's Appraisal Remedy
On September 23, 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court examined, for the
first time since its decision in Weinberger, the exclusivity of the appraisal
remedy in buyout merger transactions.10 6 In Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt
Corp., the court broadened the scope of Weinberger to consider allowing
traditional remedies beyond appraisal proceedings for shareholders alleging
procedural unfair dealing that has a "reasonable bearing on substantial is-
their loss may be, "subject only to the narrow limitation that one cannot take speculative
effects of the merger into account." Id. at 714.
The then existing valuation procedures were apparently very structured and mechanistic.
See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712 ("'Delaware block' or weighted average method was em-
ployed wherein the elements of value, i.e., assets, market price, earnings, etc., were assigned a
particular weight and the resulting amounts added to determine the value per share.") (citing
In re General Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 497-98, 52 A.2d 6, 14-15 (1947).
102. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715; see David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., 281 A.2d
30 (Del. Ch. 1971) and Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962)
(mandating a shareholder's recourse to the basic remedy of appraisal).
103. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
104. Id. at 715.
105. 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
106. Id.
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sues affecting the price being offered"' 7 per share. The court reversed the
lower court's motion to dismiss, acknowledging that the alleged facts sup-
port a claim of unfair dealing, and stating that in the context of Weinberger's
"entire fairness" standard, such a claim deserves a more considered analysis
on remand. 118
Rabkin involved a merger in July, 1984 between the Philip A. Hunt Cor-
poration ("Hunt") and the Olin Corporation ("Olin"). Olin had acquired
63.4% of Hunt's common stock on March 1, 1983 at $25 per share pursuant
to a stock purchase agreement.10 9 The agreement stated that Olin would
pay $25 per share for Hunt's remaining common stock, acquired before
March 1, 1984. Olin did not buy any additional stock before March 1, 1984.
It did, however, offer to buy Hunt's remaining common stock for $20 per
share on March 23, 1984, after its obligation to pay $25 per share had
elapsed." 0 From the trial record, it is clear that Olin had always intended to
own 100% of Hunt."1 ' In pursuance of its goal, Olin's senior management
had its $20 per share offer endorsed by an investment bank as representing a
fair offer. The proposal was subsequently approved by Olin's Finance Com-
mittee, and thereafter, Olin alerted Hunt to the committee's approval of the
merger. In response, Hunt's board of directors obtained its own fairness
opinion from an investment banking firm, which found that, while $20 per
share was financially fair, the range of fair values was between $19 and $25
per share. 1 2 When Hunt's board of directors notified Olin that $20 per
share was a fair price but not a generous price, Olin refused to raise its
bid." 3 Nonetheless, Hunt's board unanimously recommended approval of
the merger to its shareholders at $20 per share and issued a proxy statement
in June, 1984. Because the proxy statement noted Olin's intention to vote its
64% interest in favor of the merger proposal, the merger's passage was
inevitable. "4
Hunt's minority shareholders challenged the Olin-Hunt merger in Dela-
ware's Court of Chancery. They charged that the $20 price per share was
grossly inadequate because the majority shareholders breached their fiduci-
107. Id. at 1100.
108. Id. at 1107-08.
109. Id. at 1100-01.
110. Id. at 1101-02.
111. Id. at 1101. "Several Olin interoffice memoranda referred to the eventual merger of
the two companies. One document, dated September 16, 1983, sent by Peter A. Danna to
Johnstone, then a director of both Olin and Hunt, spoke of Olin's long-term strategy which
would be relevant 'when the rest of Hunt is acquired.' " Id.
112. Id. at 1102-03.
113. Id. at 1103.
114. Id.
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ary duty of "entire fairness" by unfairly manipulating the timing of the
merger to avoid having to pay $25 per share for Hunt's remaining common
stock." 5 The majority shareholders responded by claiming that the minor-
ity shareholders' argument goes to the issue of fair price, which under Wein-
berger is remedied by an appraisal remedy. The minority shareholders
countered by arguing that appraisal is inadequate in their case," 6 and alleg-
ing that procedural unfairness entitles them to broader relief than appraisal
proceeding.' The Delaware Court of Chancery granted the majority
shareholders' motion to dismiss, however, because absent claims of fraud or
deception, the minority shareholders are relegated to an appraisal proceed-
ing as their sole remedy." 8 The minority shareholders appealed.
Although the Delaware Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the
minority shareholders' claims, it questioned whether the lower court prop-
erly dismissed the minority's claims on the ground that absent fraud or de-
ception, Weinberger mandates their sole remedy to be appraisal." 9 The
court reversed the motion to dismiss and remanded the case to the Court of
Chancery to hear the minority's claim of procedural unfairness.' 2 ' The
court noted that Weinberger does not necessarily make appraisal a share-
holder's sole remedy nor does Weinberger's mandate of fair dealing turn
solely on issues of deception. 1 ' Rather, Weinberger mandates a review of a
transaction's fair dealing that includes procedural fairness by embracing
"questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, struc-
tured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the
115. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 480 A.2d 655, 658-59 (Del. Ch. 1984). Spe-
cifically the minority shareholders alleged three claims to support its allegation of unfair deal-
ing manipulation: "breach of the fiduciary duty of entire fairness, breach of fiduciary duty
under Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., and promissory estoppel." Id. at 659 (citation
omitted).
116. 498 A.2d at 1103-04. The minority shareholders contended that appraisal is inade-
quate because "(1) the alleged wrongdoers are not parties to an appraisal proceeding, and thus
are not personally accountable for their actions; (2) if such misconduct is proven, then the
corporation should not have to bear the financial burden which only falls upon it in an ap-
praisal award; and (3) overreaching and unfair dealing are not addressed by an appraisal." Id.
at 1104.
117. Id. at 1103.
118. Id. at 1104. The Court of Chancery reasoned that: "[w]here... there are no allega-
tions of nondisclosures or misrepresentations, Weinberger mandates that plaintiffs' entire fair-
ness claims be determined in an appraisal proceeding." Rabkin, 480 A.2d at 660.
119. 498 A.2d at 1104.
120. Id. at 1107-08. "At the very least the facts alleged import a form of overreaching, and
in the context of entire fairness they deserve more considered analysis than can be accorded
them on a motion to dismiss." Id. at 1107.
121. Id. at 1104-05. The court stated that "the trial court's narrow interpretation of Wein-
berger would render meaningless our extensive discussion of fair dealing found in that opin-
ion." Id. at 1104.
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directors and the stockholders were obtained."' 22 Nonetheless, a mere alle-
gation of unfair dealing cannot survive a motion to dismiss, the court stated,
without some claim of "specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other
items of misconduct."'
123
The court pointed out that the minority shareholders were not only argu-
ing fair price, an issue that the appraisal remedy could resolve, but they were
alleging manipulative conduct by the majority shareholders, who timed the
merger to deprive the minority shareholders of $25 per share. 124 Acknowl-
edging that Olin had no legal obligation to effect the merger before March 1,
1984 and pay $25 per share, the court stated that inequitable conduct will
not be guarded simply because it is not illegal.' 2 5 Therefore, the Court of
Chancery was summoned to reexamine the Olin-Hunt merger with a focus
on both fair price and fair dealing as mandated in Weinberger. 126
3. Delaware's Business Purpose Element in the "Going Private"
Merger Context
The requirement that the controlling shareholder group must state a valid
business purpose in a "going private" merger transaction is closely linked to
the requirement that the controlling shareholder group satisfy its fiduciary
duty of fairness to the outside shareholder group. Whether to include the
business purpose element in the mix of factors that weigh into the "entire
fairness" test of "going private" mergers has been a matter of considerable
debate.' 2 7 Delaware case law originally did not require management to
prove a business purpose when initiating a "going private" merger. This
policy, however, was reversed with Singer, which required proof of a busi-
ness purpose. Then, the Delaware Supreme Court announced its decision in
Weinberger, which not only relegated complaining shareholders to appraisal
remedy in most situations, but overruled Singer's business purpose element.
This marked a return to the pre-Singer policy that no business purpose need
be stated in a "going private" merger transaction.
In 1962, the Delaware Supreme Court in Stauffer v. Standard Brands,
122. Id. at 1104 (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711).
123. 498 A.2d at 1105 (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703).
124. 498 A.2d at 1105-06.
125. Id. at 1106-07; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985); Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982); Schnell v. Chris-Craft In-
dus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
126. 498 A.2d at 1107.
127. See generally A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2; 15 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7160.5 (rev. perm. ed. 1983) (citing
cases that have held that cash mergers must meet two tests under state law: a "fairness" test
and a "business purpose" test).
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Inc. 128 considered and rejected the necessity of the control group to state a
valid business purpose before implementing a short-form merger. In Stauf-
fer, a minority shareholder in a subsidiary corporation sued to set aside a
short-form merger with the parent corporation, which owned more than
90% of the subsidiary's stock. The minority shareholder claimed that the
cash offer of $105 per share was inadequate and the transaction lacked a
business purpose and, therefore, constituted constructive fraud by the con-
trol group.' 29  Delaware's Court of Chancery upheld the short-form
merger.130 The court stated that whenever minority shareholders primarily
allege an undervaluation of shares in a short-form merger, valuation ap-
praisal is their only remedy. 3 1 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court
dismissed the claim of fraud and limited the issue in the case solely to the
value of the cashed-out shares.'3 2 It initially stated that the "very purpose"
of a short-form merger is to give the parent corporation "a means of elimi-
nating the minority shareholders' interest in the enterprise."'13 3 Therefore,
in the absence of fraud, where the only dispute is as to the value of the
minority's share, the court stated that such a transaction did not require the
proffering party to state a business purpose. The court, therefore, ruled that
an appraisal proceeding was the dissatisfied shareholder's exclusive medium
of relief. '34
A decade and a half later, the Delaware Supreme Court overruled Stauffer
and expanded the "entire fairness" test of Sterling to include a "valid busi-
ness purpose" when implementing a long-form merger. In Singer v.
Magnavox Co., the minority shareholders challenged the Magnavox Com-
pany's long-form merger on the grounds that it was not motivated by a valid
business purpose.' 35 The minority contended that the sole purpose of the
merger was to enable the majority to obtain complete ownership of
Magnavox.' 3 6 The court stated that a merger with no purpose other than
the elimination of minority shareholders from the company, regardless of
the amount of cash paid them, would be a breach of the majority sharehold-
128. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983).
129. Stauffer, 187 A.2d at 80.
130. Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 178 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1962).
131. Id. at 316.
132. Stauffer, 187 A.2d at 80. But see Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318,
11 A.2d 331, 338 (1940) (stating that a merger must be "fair and equitable in the circum-
stances of the case" in order to withstand the veto of a dissenting shareholder).
133. Stauffer, 187 A.2d at 80.
134. Id.
135. 380 A.2d 969, 972 (Del. 1977). See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
136. 380 A.2d at 978.
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ers' fiduciary duty of "entire fairness" and was therefore wrong. 3 7 The
court rejected the majority shareholders' argument, which relied principally
on Stauffer, that fiduciary obligation was unnecessary because the minority
shareholders had an appraisal remedy available and because business pur-
pose was irrelevant for judicial purposes.' 3 8 This fiduciary obligation, the
court asserted, would not be discharged simply because the minority share-
holders had an appraisal remedy available.' 3 9 Rather, the court suggested
that the majority shareholders' "purpose" in implementing a "going private"
merger should be a specific element to be weighed in determining its fairness
to the minority shareholders. "4 Finally, the Singer court stated that an im-
proper purpose should preclude the majority shareholders from exercising
their voting control so as to implement the merger.14 1
In another long-form merger, Tanzer v. International General Indus-
tries, 14 2 the Delaware Supreme Court went further than Singer. In Tanzer,
the parent corporation desired to merge its majority-owned subsidiary into
the parent corporation so that the assets of the subsidiary would be available
to facilitate long-term financing by the parent corporation. The court held
this purpose valid.' 4 3 Acknowledging that the majority shareholders of a
corporation had a right to control the future of the corporation and that it
was not necessarily wrong for the majority shareholders to consider their
private interests in merging out the minority shareholders, the court none-
theless limited this control by applying the Singer requirement of a valid
business purpose.'" The court specifically required that the purpose of the
merger be "bona fide," meaning that it be something more than a mere sub-
terfuge to eliminate the minority shareholders.14 The Tanzer court thereby
reaffirmed the test of "entire fairness" as imposed by both Singer and Ster-
ling by including a business purpose element. 14 6
137. Id. at 980. The court stated:
[W]hile we agree with the conclusion of the Court of Chancery that this merger was
not fraudulent merely because it was accomplished without any purpose other than
elimination of the minority stockholders, we conclude that, for that reason, it was
violative of the fiduciary duty owed by the majority to the minority stockholders.
Id.
138. Id. at 978. The Delaware Supreme Court found Stauffer inapplicable to Singer be-
cause Stauffer was not a cash merger "whose sole purpose was to eliminate minority stock-
holders." Rothschild, supra note 30, at 206.
139. Singer, 380 A.2d at 977.
140. Id. at 978-80.
141. Id.
142. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
143. 379 A.2d at 1124-25.
144. Id. at 1124.
145. Id.
146. Id. ("[I]n any event, a bonafide purpose notwithstanding, IGI must be prepared to
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In Roland International Corp. v. Najjar, 147 the Delaware Supreme Court
continued its expansion of the "entire fairness" test of Singer and Sterling to
include short-form mergers. The court applied the rule of Singer and
Tanzer, which required the majority shareholders to demonstrate a valid
"corporate purpose"' 4 8 for implementing the cash-out merger. In Roland,
the majority shareholders admitted that the sole purpose of the merger was
to eliminate the minority shareholders from the Roland International Cor-
poration. 4 9 As a result, the court held that a merger effected for no other
reason than to exclude public shareholders from future participation in the
company would give rise to a claim of breach of fiduciary duty.150
In 1983, the Delaware Supreme Court again changed its position. In
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., ' the court overruled the business purpose re-
quirement as established in the trilogy of Singer, Tanzer, and Roland,
thereby stripping one of the essential ingredients from the test of "entire
fairness." The Weinberger court returned to the Stauffer rule and held, con-
sistent with that decision, that majority shareholders are not required to
demonstrate a valid business purpose when effecting corporate mergers.5 2
Further, the court stated its desire to return to the principle holding that a
dissenting shareholder in a cash-out merger is limited to an appraisal remedy
of his shares.' 53 In so holding, the court noted that the requirement of a
business purpose was new to Delaware law governing corporate mergers and
that Singer and its progeny were a departure from Stauffer and prior case
law.1 54 The court stated its belief that Delaware's expanded appraisal rem-
edy available to shareholders would give adequate protection and fairness.
Therefore, requiring a business purpose, the court stated, would no longer be
show that it has met its duty, imposed by Singer and Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp. of
'entire fairness' to the minority." (citation omitted)).
147. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979). See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
148. Roland, 407 A.2d at 1036-37.
149. Id. at 1033, 1037.
150. Id. at 1036.
151. 457 A.2d 701 (1983). See supra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
152. Id. at 715.
153. Id. The Weinberger court stated that
[i]n view of the fairness test which has long been applicable to parent-subsidiary
mergers, Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp ... the expanded appraisal remedy
now available to shareholders, and the broad discretion of the Chancellor to fashion
such relief as the facts of a given case may dictate, we do not believe that any addi-
tional meaningful protection is afforded minority shareholders by the business pur-
pose requirement . ...
Id. (citation omitted).
154. Id. The Weinberger court stated that it would return to the principles of Stauffer v.
Standard Brands, Inc., which implicitly denied the necessity of stating a valid business purpose
before implementing a merger. Id. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
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of any force or effect in Delaware.' 55
As the preceding cases demonstrate, the Delaware courts have extended
the requirement of a fiduciary duty of fair dealing and fair price to the "go-
ing private" transaction. The requirement of a valid business purpose, how-
ever, has been excised from the "entire fairness" test. Although the trilogy
of Singer, Tanzer, and Roland concluded that even compliance with the let-
ter of Delaware's merger statutes should not insulate the control group's
actions from scrutiny as to the purpose of a cash-out merger, the Delaware
Supreme Court has concluded that the other remedies available to minority
shareholders make the business purpose test unnecessary.
The Singer trilogy established two principles of law to be included in the
mix of elements constituting the "entire fairness" test for "going private"
mergers. First, the control group was said to owe a general fiduciary duty of
fair dealing and fair price to the minority shareholders in its exercise over
the corporate powers and property. Second, the courts were summoned to
examine the business purpose underlying corporate transactions that alleg-
edly violate the general fiduciary duty of fair dealing owed to minority share-
holders. A violation of either of these principles, the Singer trilogy
concluded, would allow the court to grant equitable relief as needed.'5 6 The
Weinberger court, however, adopted only the first of these principles to in-
clude in its "entire fairness" test. Moreover, the Weinberger court effectively
consigned the minority to an appraisal proceeding in which to defend its
right to corporate participation.' 57 These differences in the "entire fairness"
tests and their impact on outside shareholders involved in a leveraged
buyout transaction will be discussed in subsequent sections of this Comment.
B. Federal Regulation of "Going Private" Transactions
In 1974, A. A. Sommer, Jr., then a commissioner of the SEC, delivered
the initial federal response to the "going private" phenomenon.15 8 He raised
several policy concerns5 9 and focused on the duty that management owed
to the minority shareholders. Sommer stated that the obligation of fiduciary
duty by officers and directors requires that they be "fair" and not deprive the
shareholders of their investment if the shareholders choose to retain their
shares. He urged that corporations engaged in "going private" transactions
should be required to show a "compelling business purpose" so as to ensure
155. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715.
156. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980.
157. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714; Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1981).
158. See A. Sommer, supra note 1, at D-1.
159. Id. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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fairness to public shareholders,"6 regardless of whether they received an ad-
equate price for their shares in the "going private" transaction.' 6' Sommer
concluded that a breach of fiduciary duty could be sustained only after a
"sensitive balancing" of the public shareholders' interests and the corpora-
tion's purported business purpose. 162
Following Sommer's statements, the Commission addressed the fairness
concern in 1975163 and again in 19 7 7 ,IM by issuing for public comment,
notices of proposed rule 13e-3 under section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Proposed Rule 13e-3). 16' These proposed rules would have
given the SEC the power to judge the substantive and procedural fairness of
a "going private" transaction and to prohibit those transactions it deemed to
be "unfair" to the outside shareholders. 166 In effect, the rules were intended
to protect the interests of minority shareholders in "going private"
transactions.
The 1975 proposed rule 13e-3 initially suggested a definition for a "going
private" transaction, 167 because none existed under the federal securities
laws at that time. Then the SEC proffered two versions of the rule that
160. Id. According to Sommer, "when a corporation chooses to tap public sources of
money, it makes a commitment that, absent the most compelling business justification, man-
agement and those in control will do nothing to interfere with the liquidity of the public invest-
ment or the protection afforded the public by the federal securities laws." Id. at D-4.
161. Id.
162. Id
163. See Securities Exchange Commission Release No. 34-11231 (proposed Feb. 6, 1975),
40 Fed. Reg. 7947 (1975) ("Notice of Public Investigatory and Rulemaking Proceedings in the
Matter of Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates") [hereinafter
cited as 1975 Proposed Rule 13e-3]. The 1975 SEC Rule 13e-3 prescribed disclosure and spec-
ified that transactions thereunder be undertaken for a valid business purpose and at a fair
price. Id.
164. See Securities Exchange Commission Release No. 34-14185 (proposed Nov. 17, 1977),
42 Fed. Reg. 60,090 (1977) (proposed rule concerning "Going Private Transactions by Public
Companies or Their Affiliates") [hereinafter cited as 1977 Proposed Rule 13e-3].
165. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1982). Section 13(e)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for an issuer. . . to purchase any equity security issued by it if
such purchase is in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission,
in the public interest or for the protection of investors, may adopt (A) to define acts
and practices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, and (B) to prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices.
Id. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., 1977 Proposed Rule 13e-3, supra note 164.
167. One suggestion was to define the transaction as that "which would, if successful, per-
mit the issuer to cease filing reports under the Exchange Act." See 1975 Proposed Rule 13e-3,
supra note 163, 40 Fed Reg. at 7948. Another suggestion called it a transaction by an issuer
"which might directly or indirectly result in the issuer being able to cease filing reports under
the Exchange Act or which might result in a significant impairment in the liquidity of the
trading market in its equity securities." Id.
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would govern the "going private" transaction. The 1975 proposed rule 13e-
3A would have made a company's purchase of its own securities unlawful
unless it complied with specific substantive and procedural disclosure re-
quirements.1 68 Additionally, this version of the rule would have required
that the consideration offered to the minority shareholders "constitute fair
value . . . as determined in good faith" by the company, and that it "shall
be no lower than [the consideration] recommended jointly by two qualified
independent persons."' 69 The second version of the rule, 13e-3B, included
similar disclosure requirements to those set forth in proposed rule 13e-3A.
Rule 13e-3B, however, required that a company buying out its minority
shareholders demonstrate that a valid business purpose existed for the
transaction. 170
The 1977 proposed rule 13e-3 provided numerous disclosure and an-
tifraud provisions to regulate "going private" transactions. In addition to
numerous disclosure requirements,17' the proposed rule stated that any such
transaction found to be unfair would be considered a fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative act, prohibited by section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act. 172 Moreover, the 1977 proposed rule 13e-3 would have authorized the
courts to consider all relevant factors surrounding a "going private" transac-
tion to ensure fairness and minority shareholder protection.' 73 Further, the
proposed rule would have combined the uniformity of a federal fairness stan-
168. Id. at 7949, where the Commission stated the requisite information for proposed rule
13e-3A. It would include, among other things:
the source of funds for the transaction, the purposes of the transaction and intentions
with respect to the future conduct of the business, background information regarding
affiliates, an opinion of counsel respecting the legality of the transaction, certain fi-
nancial information, recent acquisitions of securities, dividend and market price in-
formation, and a summary of an evaluation by two qualified independent persons of
the consideration to be offered to the security holders of the affected class of securi-
ties who are not affiliates of the issuer.
Id. See id. at 7951 (1975 Proposed Rule 13e-3A(c)(1)i-xx).
169. See 1975 Proposed Rule 13e-3A(c)(2), which states:
(2) The consideration for the equity securities to be purchased shall constitute fair
value to the security holders of such class of the issuer who are not affiliates as deter-
mined in good faith by the issuer or its affiliate, and shall be no lower than that
recommended jointly by two qualified independent persons. Such persons, in recom-
mending the consideration, shall consider, among other factors, the value of the as-
sets and earning power of the issuer.
40 Fed. Reg. at 7951.
170. See 1975 Proposed Rule 13e-3B(a)(l), which states that certain transactions are un-
lawful unless: "(1) if such transaction is entered into by the issuer, such issuer has a valid
business purpose for doing so .... " 40 Fed. Reg. at 7952.
171. See generally 1977 Proposed Rule 13e-3, supra note 164.
172. 1977 Proposed Rule 13e-3(b)(1)(i), 42 Fed. Reg. at 60,101.
173. 1977 Proposed Rule 13e-3(b)(2)(iii)(A) to (J), 42 Fed. Reg. at 60,101.
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dard with an in-depth scrutiny of substantive fairness not provided by cur-
rent disclosure laws. 174 However, in the midst of an avalanche of critical
comments from the corporate community questioning the Commission's
statutory authority to impose such substantive fairness standards, the Com-
mission retreated from its proposed assertion of substantive regulation to
judge the fairness of "going private" transactions. 175
The Commission's 1977 proposed rule 13e-3 may have been influenced by
the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Santa Fe Industries v.
Green, 176 determining whether the federal securities laws provide a remedy
for breach of fiduciary duty by officers, directors, and majority shareholders
in connection with a "going private" transaction.1 77 The Supreme Court's
decision effectively removed the issue of fiduciary duty of fairness in the con-
text of a "going private" transaction from the jurisdiction of section 10(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act. The Supreme Court noted, however, that
the Commission's authority to initiate other rules for "going private" trans-
actions was unaffected by the Court's decision that "going private" cases are
unactionable under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act. 178
In this short-form merger, Santa Fe Industries owned more than 90% of
the outstanding stock of a subsidiary, Kirby Lumber Corporation, and de-
sired to acquire 100% ownership of that corporation.179 The control group
of Santa Fe Industries used a Delaware short-form merger statute, permit-
ting payment of cash to the subsidiary's minority shareholders for their
shares and restricting these shareholders to an appraisal action in state court
if they expressed dissatisfaction with the price they received.' The control
group disclosed all material information relative to the value of the subsidi-
174. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985); see also Note, Fairness in "Going Private"
Transactions: Federal Authorization of Substantive Regulation, 58 B.U.L. REv. 792, 802
(1978) for an in-depth analysis of the 1977 Proposed Rule 13e-3.
175. See Securities Exchange Commission Release No. 34-16075 ("Going Private Transac-
tions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates") 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736 (1979). The release stated
that
[miost of the commentators were opposed to the requirement in the 1977 proposals
that a Rule 13e-3 transaction must be both substantively and procedurally fair to
unaffiliated security holders. A number of these commentators expressed the view
that the Commission does not have the authority to adopt such a requirement. ...
The Commission believes that the question of regulation of the fairness of going
private transactions should be deferred until there is an opportunity to determine the
efficacy of the provisions of Rule 13e-3.
44 Fed. Reg. at 46,736.
176. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
177. Id. at 464-65.
178. Id. at 473 n.12.
179. Id. at 465.
180. Id. at 465-66.
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ary's stock.' Nevertheless, the dissatisfied shareholders brought suit in
federal district court contesting the fairness of the "going private"
merger. 182
The minority shareholders alleged that the merger was a manipulative or
deceptive practice and sought remedy under section 10(b)'8 3 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act and the Commission's rule lOb-5.184 They alleged that
rule lOb-5 was breached because the offered price of $150 per share was
grossly inadequate, the merger had no valid business purpose, and the sole
purpose of the merger was the elimination of the minority shareholders. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.' 8 5 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
reasoning that rule lOb-5 reached breaches of fiduciary duty despite the ma-
jority shareholders' full disclosure of material information to the minority
181. Id. at 466.
182. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides
in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
Compare the language of § 10(b) which includes the terms "manipulative" and "deceptive"
with the language of § 13(e), see supra note 165, which includes the terms "fraudulent," "ma-
nipulative," and "deceptive." The additional term in § 13(e) "was part of legislation intended
by Congress to close a gap in the federal securities laws, and thus the Commission is promul-
gating its [going private] rules under that section." SEC Proposes Rule on "Going Private,
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 429, at A-6 (Nov. 23, 1977).
184. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985). SEC rule lOb-5 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circr-nstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
Id.
185. 391 F. Supp. at 852, 855-56. The district court stated that rule lOb-5 requires only full
disclosure. The court reasoned that if the majority discloses that its purpose is to eliminate
minority shareholder interests in the corporation, then the transaction is "beyond the purview
of Rule lOb-5." Id. at 854.
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shareholders. '86
The Supreme Court reversed.' 87 The Court reasoned that the federal se-
curities laws were designed to protect investors by requiring full and honest
disclosure of material facts so that investors could make informed invest-
ment decisions.' 8 The Court found that the control group implementing
the merger had indeed disclosed all material information relative to the value
of the subsidiary's stock and therefore did not breach their corporate fiduci-
ary duty in violation of rule lOb-5.' 89 Moreover, the Court refused to over-
ride or interfere with established state policies concerning this area of
corporate regulation and, accordingly, relegated the dissatisfied sharehold-
ers' claim to state law for relief.19 The Court held unequivocably that "go-
ing private" transactions, even if unfair, could not be attacked under rule
l0b-5 or other federal securities laws absent allegations of nondisclosure or
misrepresentation of material facts, or manipulation that involved nondisclo-
sure. As a result of the Green decision, "going private" transactions ap-
peared to be solely a matter of state law.
In 1979, the SEC issued another notice of proposed rule 13e-3 in an at-
tempt to extend the federal securities laws to remedy the claims of "unfair-
ness" stemming from "going private" transactions.' 9 ' The 1979 proposed
rule 13e-3, however, did not include the earlier controversial substantive
fairness provisions, which would have prohibited transactions that were "un-
fair" to outside shareholders.192 The Commission adopted this version of
rule 13e-3.' 93 Ordinarily, when a company "goes private," it will be subject
186. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976).
187. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
188. Id. at 477-78.
189. Id. at 474.
190. Id. at 478. The Court stated:
The Delaware Legislature has supplied minority shareholders with a cause of action
in the Delaware Court of Chancery to recover the fair value of shares allegedly un-
dervalued in a short form merger .... Of course, the existence of a particular state-
law remedy is not dispositive of the question whether Congress meant to provide a
similar federal remedy, but ... we conclude that "it is entirely appropriate in this
instance to relegate respondent and others in his situation to whatever remedy is
created by state law."
Id. (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 41
(1977)).
Notably, the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of relief available under the federal
securities laws for breaches of fiduciary duty "may have actually been a causative element" of
the Singer decision and its progeny. Rothschild, supra note 30, at 199.
191. See Securities Exchange Commission Release No. 34-16075, 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736
(1979) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985)).
192. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
193. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985). In adopting the 1979 version of rule 13e-3, the
Commission felt that state court decisions such as Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del.
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to the requirements of this adopted rule,' 94 which merely requires disclosure
and prohibits fraud or untrue statements. 95
In conjunction with rule 13e-3, the Commission adopted schedule 13E-
3196 as a detailed disclosure form for "going private" transactions that fall
within the scope of the rule. The disclosures are intended to reveal specific
information that the Commission believes is needed by investors in corpora-
tions that are engaging in "going private" transactions. Among the matters
to be disclosed by such corporations are whether ratification by a majority of
the outside shareholders is required,' whether a fairness opinion of the
transaction was rendered,' 9 ' and whether the outside directors approve the
transaction.' 99 The most significant item of schedule 13E-3 is the require-
ment that the control group attest to the fairness of the transaction. Item 8
requires the control group to formally state on the record whether it "rea-
sonably believes" that the rule 13e-3 transaction is "fair or unfair" to the
outside shareholders, and to discuss the basis for that belief.2°°
In sum, even with the adoption of rule 13e-3, the federal securities laws do
not require that a proposed leveraged buyout or any "going private" transac-
tion must, in fact, be "fair." Green specifically stated that section 10(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act and the Commission's rule lOb-5 were not
meant to cover allegations of corporate mismanagement in which the com-
1977) and Tanzer v. Int'l. General Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), which were effective law
at that time, provided adequate protection to outside shareholders from control persons acting
unfairly when taking a company private. See Securities Exchange Commission No. 34-16075,
supra note 175, 44 Fed. Reg. at 46,736.
194. See generally supra note 193; see also A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note
2, at 325, explaining the applicability of this rule:
This rule applies when, as a result of the proposed transaction, the number of share-
holders of record would drop below 300, when the company would lose its listing on
any of the ten national securities exchanges, or when it would become ineligible for
quotation by NASDAQ. The mere "reasonable likelihood" that any of these results
would occur is enough to invoke the rule.
195. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985).
196. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1985).
197. Item 8(c) of Schedule 13E-3 reads: "(c) State whether the transaction is structured so
that approval of at least a majority of unaffiliated security holders is required." Id.
198. Item 8(d) of Schedule 13E-3 reads: "(d) State whether a majority of directors who are
not employees of the issuer has retained an unaffiliated representative to act solely on behalf of
unaffiliated security holders for the purposes of negotiating the terms of the Rule 13e-3 trans-
action and/or preparing a report concerning the fairness of such transaction." Id.
199. Item 8(e) of Schedule 13E-3 reads: "(e) State whether the Rule 13e-3 transaction was
approved by a majority of the directors of the issuer who are not employees of the issuer." Id.
200. Items 8(a) and (b) of Schedule 13E-3 pertain to disclosure of the fairness of the trans-
action and read: "(a) State whether the issuer or affiliate filing this schedule reasonably be-
lieves that the Rule 13e-3 transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security holders. . . . (b)
Discuss in reasonable detail the material factors upon which the belief stated in Item 8(a) is
based .... " Id.
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plaint avers that the outside shareholders were not treated fairly by a fiduci-
ary.2"' It further stated that in the absence of deficiencies in disclosure,
outside shareholders contesting the "fairness" of the transaction would be
relegated to state courts for relief. In the same vein, the Commission's rule
13e-3 and attendant schedule 13E-3 require merely that the control group
make disclosures and state its reasonable belief regarding whether the lever-
aged buyout or any "going private" transaction is fair or unfair to the
outside shareholders.2"2 Therefore, outside shareholders who have com-
plaints concerning the transaction, other than those associated with disclo-
sure, are forced to seek redress in state court, where they and especially
those shareholders involved in a leveraged buyout may well receive an inade-
quate remedy.
II. THE LEVERAGED BUYOUT TRANSACTION
In most situations, neither the federal securities laws through rule 13e-3
disclosure requirements nor Delaware court decisions advocating appraisal
remedies are adequate vehicles to redress outside shareholder grievances
stemming from the leveraged buyout transaction. In examining such trans-
actions, both federal and state forums fail to consider the best interests of
outside shareholders. This Comment strives to focus attention on this troub-
lesome situation of outside shareholders by calling for an upgraded standard
of "entire fairness" for the leveraged buyout transaction. This standard will
include a discussion of fair dealing (which includes full disclosure), fair
price, and a valid business purpose, other than one designed solely to elimi-
nate the outside shareholders. Initially, a discussion of the unique character-
istics of this type of transaction will reveal the need for its specialized
treatment. In fact, in 1979 the SEC sensed the need for special focus on the
leveraged buyout and issued an interpretative release containing elements
the Commission deemed unfair to outside shareholders.20 3
201. Green, 430 U.S. at 477.
202. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text. In 1981 the obligation of manage-
ment to disclose this information was reaffirmed by the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance.
See Securities Exchange Commission Release No. 34-17719, 46 Fed. Reg. 22,571 (1981). This
interpretative release was accompanied by Securities Exchange Commission Release No. 34-
17720, 46 Fed. Reg. 22,602 (1981), which proposed several amendments to Rule 13e-3 and
Schedule 13E-3.
203. Securities Exchange Commission Release No. 34-15572, 44 Fed. Reg. 11,537 (1979)
(SEC Staff Interpretations on Disclosure of Certain Sales of Assets Transactions). In this in-
terpretative release, the SEC staff focused on the potential conflict of interest faced by control-
ling shareholder/managers negotiating the terms of a leveraged buyout transaction.
Additional concerns were raised in the release, which are discussed infra notes 205-12; see also
In re Woods Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-15337 (Nov. 16, 1978), 16 SEC
Doc. No. 166 (Nov. 29, 1978) and In re Spartek Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-
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In the leveraged buyout transaction, management's inherent status as both
buyer and seller of the corporation leads to conflict of interest and potential
inequity. While management can benefit substantially from this type of
transaction, management owes a fiduciary duty of fairness to its public
shareholders. As required by general fiduciary principles under state law,
management should act as a prudent seller of the corporation and seek the
highest price for its public shareholders. Simultaneously, however, manage-
ment may act as a prudent purchaser of the corporation and seek the lowest
possible price to enhance its own financial position. By purchasing at a low
price, management's debt and risk are minimized. As a result of its dual
role, by acting on both sides of the same transaction, management places
itself in a self-dealing transaction." Beyond this, the leveraged buyout is
unusual in that it provides a means by which management can assume own-
ership and control of a corporation with a relatively small personal invest-
ment. This is possible because the assets and funds of the acquired
corporation are used to finance the buyout.2 °5
At the same time, the control group will often be motivated by the oppor-
tunity to buy the company at a bargain price,2 6 because its listed stock price
and future earnings power may be undervalued by the market and manage-
ment. The control group can also realize the tax benefits of high leverage.20 7
Moreover, the control group will no longer be required to comply with bur-
densome SEC disclosure requirements with which public companies must
comply under the federal securities laws.208 Further, the managing segment
of the purchasing group is given an opportunity to rekindle its "en-
15567, 16 SEC Doc. No. 1094 (Feb. 27, 1979) (where Commission orders for administrative
proceedings show the SEC's readiness to proceed against control groups implementing lever-
aged buyouts without adherence to some standard of fairness).
204. Self-dealing is present when the majority shareholders of a corporation cause it to act
in a manner whereby the majority shareholders receive something from the corporation to the
detriment and exclusion of the minority shareholders. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717, 720 (Del. 1971).
205. See B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 2, 16.
206. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 17, at 15, col. 1 (listing low price as a primary motivating
factor of the Empire, Inc. buyout).
207. L. Lederman, R. Citron & R. Macris, supra note 9, at 286. These benefits include
"deductibility of interest payments and tax-free return of capital to investors in the form of
ultimate repayment of principal." Id.
208. See B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 3. In a leveraged buyout, the acquired company
becomes a private company, effectively removing itself from the disclosure reporting required
of public companies under the federal securities laws. See also Williams, supra note 5, at 18,
cols. 1-2. "Sometimes the motive for going private is mainly management's desire to avoid the
record-keeping, shareholder meetings and other tedious hassles associated with being a public
company.").
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trepreneurial spirit"2 °9 and take greater business risks, without the fear of
"inquisitive shareholders and Wall Street analysts."'2 1 Finally, when the
market improves for investing, the purchasing group can consider returning
the company to public ownership, thereby realizing a large profit. E1 '
Another significant and unique characteristic of the leveraged buyout is
the purchasing group's use of the company's assets as collateral for the large
loans needed to buy out the company's outstanding shares.2 12 Despite man-
agement's allegation that the company is experiencing business losses and
needs a buyout to ameliorate the situation, it is probable that the assets of
the company have sufficient value to serve as collateral needed by the control
group to implement the buyout. It is equally probable that the company has
a steady cash flow that will enable it to satisfy the potentially large loan
payments it incurs in securing financing for the transaction. From any point
of view, the control group enjoys an array of advantages from leveraged
buyout transactions.
Conversely, the leveraged buyout is fraught with disadvantages for the
selling company's outside shareholder group, which is afforded none of the
opportunities of the control group. For instance, the outside shareholder
group receives only cash in the transaction and is excluded from all future
equity participation. 213 This group's expectation of participation in the fu-
ture profits of the company or increases in stock value is extinguished.2 14
209. See, e.g., Waters, supra note 4, at 47 (explaining management's opportunity to com-
pletely control the company as one of the primary reasons for the increase in leveraged buyout
transactions).
210. Scott, supra note 5, at 19, col. 2 ("That kind of scrutiny-especially whan a company
is struggling-can pressure management into short-term strategies just to pacify this
constituency.").
211. See, e.g., Waters, supra note 4, at 48, 53. Gibson Greeting Cards, Inc. engaged in a
leveraged buyout transaction in January of 1982 for $81 million, well under book value. All
but $1 million of it was financed by bank loans and real estate leasebacks. In May of 1983,
Gibson went public, its $81 million investment skyrocketed into stock worth an estimated $280
million. See Bus. WK., supra note 3 (explaining that the significant increase in the value of the
Gibson shares was due primarily to the below book value purchase, the economy's continued
strengthening, and the drop in interest rates from their mid-1982 highs); see also Scott, supra
note 5, at 20, col. 3, wherein Richard W. Madresh, senior vice-president at Security Pacific
Business Credit, which has financed some $800 million in leveraged buyouts, explains that an
"investment banker says we'll take the company private, run it more efficiently, more profita-
bly, then take it public again and make a killing in the market."
212. For example, assume a leveraged buyout of a company goes for $100,000. The
purchasing group may put up $10,000 of its own money and borrow the remaining $90,000
against the assets of the company. It then uses its cash flow from earnings and operations to
repay the debt. Thus, the purchasing group ends up owning the company by using other
people's money.
213. See, e.g., B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 1 (reviewing the effects of leveraged buyouts).
214. See A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 318.
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Although the disparate treatment between these two groups is difficult to
calculate in terms of dollars, there exists, nonetheless, unequal treatment.
Clearly, the control group establishes the terms of the transaction. Thus,
from a public policy perspective, leveraged buyouts present the danger that
the public shareholder will become hostile toward American corporate mo-
res and the securities markets. This is important because the public's atti-
tude toward the markets has a significant impact on the state of the
215economy. Consequently, this type of transaction, which continues to be
reported regularly in the The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times,
needs specialized regulation consistent with the underlying philosophy of the
federal securities laws-investor protection and preservation of the integrity
of the financial markets.21 6 Such specialized regulation does not currently
exist. This Comment will present a framework for such regulation for the
leveraged buyout within the context of the principles of fair dealing (which
includes full disclosure), fair price, and a valid business purpose, which may
also be applicable to other "going private" transactions.
The control group of a public corporation initiating a leveraged buyout
should not be permitted to force unfairly the shareholders of the outside
group to take cash for their interest, while the control group retains the
assets and goodwill of the corporation. Accordingly, the initiation of a
leveraged buyout transaction should raise a prima facie cause of action for
breach of fiduciary responsibility and thereby place the burden on manage-
ment to show "entire fairness," despite the control group's compliance with
state merger or appraisal statutes. Adequate protection for the disadvan-
taged shareholder, therefore, should require the control group to demon-
strate the "entire fairness" of the transaction and should allow the outside
shareholders a full range of equitable remedies beyond mere appraisal. The
215. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURI-
TIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1963) (a comprehensive study of
the securities market prepared by the Securities and Exchange Comm'n at the direction of
Congress).
Securities markets in the United States are, in contemplation of law and in fact,
public markets. They are public both in the sense that large numbers of people are
directly or indirectly involved in owning and trading securities, and in the broader
sense that the performance of securities markets affects the general economy and
well-being in important ways. The former sense was recently expressed, for example,
by the president of the New York Stock Exchange as follows: "The sole purpose of a
modem marketplace is to provide the public with an efficient and dependable mecha-
nism through which securities can be bought and sold." The latter sense is expressed
by section 2 of the Exchange Act, which succinctly states various reasons why securi-
ties markets are "affected with a national public interest."
Id. (citing Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 2 (15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982) (emphasis in
original).
216. Cf id.
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analysis of "entire fairness" should consist of a scrutiny of three elements:
fair dealing (which includes full disclosure), fair price, and a valid business
purpose.2" 7 Only through an analysis consisting of these three elements can
the outside shareholder in a leveraged buyout be reasonably assured that he
is being treated with "entire fairness."
The first element, fair dealing, should encompass the duty to conduct the
leveraged buyout in a manner that protects the interests of all the sharehold-
ers.218 It should also include the manner in which the buyout transaction is
structured, timed, negotiated, and disclosed to the voting directors and
shareholders, as well as the manner in which the approval of the directors
and shareholders is sought.2 19 The second element, fair price, should en-
compass a consideration of "all relevant factors" affecting the value of a
company. 220 The final element, business purpose, should force an inquiry
into whether the control group has initiated the transaction to benefit the
acquired company or rather to benefit only the control group in terms of
future profit growth. 221  A valid business purpose for a leveraged buyout
transaction should be one that benefits the corporation and all its sharehold-
ers equitably but not necessarily identically.
To date, neither established case law nor any SEC ruling has specifically
addressed the unique characteristics of the leveraged buyout transaction, or
formulated an adequate method of assuring "entire fairness" for the outside
shareholders. While courts have applied settled law in the relative area of
"going private" transactions to leveraged buyouts, the application of law has
failed to give outside shareholders adequate assurance of an "entirely fair"
deal. The satisfaction of three elements, including fair dealing (which in-
cludes full disclosure), fair price, and a valid business purpose can reason-
ably give this assurance to the outside shareholder group. Relying on the
discussion of each of these elements set forth above in the context of Dela-
ware case law and the federal securities laws, this Comment will propose a
substantive "entire fairness" standard to be applied to leveraged buyouts.
217. See Nathan & Shapiro, Legal Standard of Fairness of Merger Terms Under Delaware
Law, 2 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 44 (1977); see also A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note
2, at 318 (recognizing in its discussion of "going private" transaction the distinctions between
the terms: fairness, business purpose, disclosure, shareholder voting, and expert opinion).
218. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-11.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 713. These factors include, among other things, the terms of the financing and
the determination of the offered price. See infra notes 308-14 and accompanying text.
221. A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 322.
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III. DELAWARE CASE LAW AND FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS:
INADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE DISADVANTAGED
SHAREHOLDER
A. Fair Dealing
The leveraged buyout creates potential for "self-dealing" by management.
Therefore, an examination of a proposed leveraged buyout should emerge
that will ensure the control group's adherence to its fiduciary duty of fair
dealing: to "disclose" conflicts of interest; to act primarily for the benefit of
the corporation and all its shareholders; and to act honestly and in good
faith. In this examination, the outside shareholders should possess addi-
tional interests in their shares, apart from the obvious monetary concern for
market value.222 The range of the additional interests can traditionally be
classified as either extreme, liberal, or moderate. The extreme position holds
that the outside shareholders have no additional interests in the corporation
other than the value of their shares and provides appraisal as their sole rem-
edy in a buyout.223 The liberal position, on the other hand, holds that the
outside shareholders have a vested right to corporate participation that goes
beyond share value.224 Finally, the moderate position rejects both the ex-
treme and liberal views and holds that the outside shareholders have some
degree of additional interest beyond share value, but may be relieved of their
right to future corporate participation if the transaction is fair and its pur-
pose "serves the corporate good." '225 This Comment adopts the moderate
222. See generally Borden, supra note 1 (examining the various degrees of interests that
shareholders may possess in their equity investment).
223. See Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Green v. Santa Fe
Indus., 533 F.2d 1283, 1306 (2d Cir. 1976) (Moore, J. dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 430
U.S. 462 (1977) (discussing Delaware's short-form merger statute, Moore stated: -[U]nder
§ 253, the 10% minority shareholder is entitled to fair value of his shares, and not to any
opportunity to thwart the will of the overwhelming majority.") (emphasis in original)); Stauf-
fer v. Standard Brands Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (1962) (stating that the purpose of
§ 253 is to allow the majority to eliminate the minority shareholders' interest and relegate
them to monetary appraisal of their bought-out shares).
224. Coleman, 638 F.2d at 634 (recognizing that minority shareholders may have an inter-
est in continued participation in the corporate enterprise); but see Borden, supra note I, at
1020-21 (discrediting the position that shareholders have a vested right in corporate participa-
tion); Chazen, Fairness From a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies, 36
Bus. LAW. 1439 (1981); Easterbrook and Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
L.J. 698 (1982) (arguing that the minority shareholders are entitled to nothing more than the
market value of their shares).
225. Coleman, 638 F.2d at 634-35 ("An intermediate position allows the majority to relieve
the minority of the right of participation, but only when it serves the corporate good; 'some-
what analogous' is the right of the sovereign to take the property of individuals under princi-
ples of eminent domain.") See Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate
Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1073 (1983) (discussing whether the
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position as the most equitable to all the parties involved in a leveraged
buyout transaction. The current federal and state laws, however, have effec-
tively rejected the moderate position, moving instead toward the extreme
position that in most situations limits outside shareholders solely to the mar-
ket value of their shares and mere disclosure of information bearing on the
offered price. Adoption of the principles of the extreme position both at the
federal and state levels will be discussed below.
1. Federal Level (Rule 13e-3 Disclosure)
Rule 13e-3, as originally proposed by the SEC in 1975, would have au-
thorized courts to consider all relevant factors involved in a "going private"
transaction.226 Further, it would have made the initiation of such a transac-
tion unlawful if it was substantively or procedurally unfair to the outside
shareholders. 227 The original version of rule 13e-3 set forth many considera-
tions by which substantive and procedural fairness would have been
judged. 22 1 It would have gone far beyond the disclosure requirements of
current rule 13e-3 and far beyond the limited protection afforded by state
appraisal remedy. The SEC, however, in adopting the 1979 version of rule
13e-3, abandoned the earlier proposed idea of a substantive fairness stan-
dard. At that time, the Commission expressed its belief that the substantive
fairness question should be deferred until a later time.229 Because the cur-
rent "going private" disclosure rules offer no meaningful protection to
outside shareholders subjected to a potentially unfair leveraged buyout
transaction, the time to consider a substantive fairness standard has arrived.
Rule 13e-3 and schedule 13E-3 do not require the proposed buyout trans-
noncontrolling shareholder should be entitled to share equally with the controlling shareholder
in the wealth of the company).
A.A. Sommer, Jr., also seemed to adopt the moderate position. He stated that "[t]he share-
holder must no longer be a second class citizen. Once he is invited to feast and he pays his
admission, those who own the tent must not be able to usher him out at the end of the second
course with only the menu at [sic] his souvenir." A. Sommer, supra note 1, at D-5.
226. See supra notes 158-74 and accompanying text.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Securities Exchange Commission Release No. 34-16075, supra note 175, 44 Fed. Reg.
at 46,736 (1979). See SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 514, at A-1 (Aug. 1, 1979). Edward F.
Greene, then director of the SEC Division of Corporate Finance, stated that
[w]hile we are not persuaded that the Commission lacks the authority to adopt such
a requirement, we do believe that the question should be deferred until there has been
an opportunity to determine the efficacy of the present disclosure proposals as well as
of the judicial remedies being created by the state courts in this area. . . . It is too
early to tell whether it may be necessary for the Commission to provide substantive
remedies in the future.
Id. at A-2.
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action to be substantively "fair." 23 Item 8 of schedule 13E-3 merely re-
quires the control group to expressly state whether it reasonably believes the
transaction is "fair or unfair" to the outside shareholders and to state the
material factors231 upon which that belief is based.232 This disclosure rule
does not compel fairness; it is designed merely to promote informed deci-
sionmaking by the corporation's shareholders. Given the required informa-
tion, the shareholders will presumably decide intelligently for themselves
what weight to accord the opinion. Management's inherent motivation to
offer outside shareholders a price "as low as reasonable pessimism will al-
low,"'2 3 3 however, casts a shadow on whether management's claim of "rea-
sonable belief" as to fairness will provide any useful guidance for
shareholders who are deciding whether to sell.234
Thus, the task of deciding whether to sell shares can become increasingly
difficult for the average shareholder. An example of this difficulty occurred
in the Stokely Van-Camp, Inc. buyout. Although shareholders were told by
the company's management that an offering price of fifty-five dollars per
share was "fair and attractive," they actually received a competing offer
price of seventy-seven dollars per share just seven weeks later.235 Stokely
Van-Camp, Inc., however, was not in violation of rule 13e-3 because the
company had fully disclosed pursuant to the requirements of schedule 13E-
3. Moreover, the SEC may not be motivated to inspect fully the accuracy of
these opinions once full disclosure has been made by the company. There-
fore, the disgruntled shareholder, who is unsuccessful in alleging a violation
of disclosure requirements under the federal securities laws, is relegated to
state law for relief.
236
In addition to these deficiencies under rule 13e-3, the outside shareholder
group receives minimal protection. The disclosure approach under the rule
provides no forum for contesting the fairness of a leveraged buyout transac-
tion. In the same vein, former SEC Commissioner, Bevis Longstreth, em-
230. See B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 7.
231. Material factors, in the context of the federal securities laws, include those items of
information that a reasonable shareholder would consider important in deciding on a course of
action. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675
F.2d 168, 176 (8th Cir. 1982).
232. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
233. B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 6 (quoting Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 1, at
298).
234. Id.
235. Id. at I (reciting facts of a specific leveraged buyout transaction which "was to be
accomplished through a merger with a newly formed private corporation which would [have]
borrow[ed] the necessary funds and secure[d] that borrowing with Stokely's assets.").
236. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977); B. Longstreth, supra note 3,
at 7.
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phasized that the disclosure requirement by no means ensures a fair deal.237
It may, he suggested, nevertheless, prompt a somewhat improved deal than
might otherwise be offered.238 Consequently, the outside shareholder works
under the erroneous assumption that he actually will have a meaningful
choice of action upon receiving the disclosed information.23 9 For example,
an outside shareholder is not offered a realistic choice if he is bought out at a
time when the company's stock is in a depressed state, even if he has a right
under state law to demand an independent appraisal of the cash price being
offered. The inherent unfairness of the lack of choice will remain, regardless
of how much disclosure is motivated by rule 13e-3. Although rule 13e-3
may supply the outside shareholder with material information, he will re-
main powerless against unfair treatment of his interest in the corporation by
the control group.
2. State Level (Fair Dealing)
In the typical leveraged buyout transaction, the control group stands on
both sides of the proposal and can dictate the terms of the transaction by
forcing the outside shareholder group to receive cash consideration for its
shares. As a result, the outside shareholders of the acquired company are
deprived of their equity interest and the acquiring company gains complete
control of the acquired company's assets.24° The control group, however,
takes measures to demonstrate that it is acting in the interest of the outside
shareholder group as required by state fiduciary principles. During this pro-
cess, the control group has available a number of procedural devices to pro-
tect itself from legal challenge. These devices include approval of the
proposed transaction by a majority of the outside shareholders, review of the
proposed transaction by the outside directors, and an opinion from an in-
dependent investment banker regarding whether the proposed transaction is
financially fair to the outside shareholders.24'
Nevertheless, each of these devices is less than adequate to ensure that the
237. B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 17.
238. Id. at 11.
239. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 21, at 904, stating that
[w]hile it might be said in the simple buy-back offer type of going private that the
public shareholder has a right to accept or reject the price tendered to him and
should not be hindered from making such a choice, the element of volition is only a
fiction if the result of the tender offer will be the elimination of a public market for
the shares; moreover, there is no choice at all in the situation where public sharehold-
ers are ejected from the corporation against their will by an overwhelming vote cast
by controlling shareholders.
240. Comment, The Fiduciary Duty of Majority Shareholders in Freezeout Mergers. A Sug-
gested Approach, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 223, 223-24 (1979).
241. See B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 7.
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outside shareholders receive a fair deal. First, ratification of the transaction
by outside shareholders is effective only if they are able to evaluate fully the
terms of the transaction and are presented with some viable options should
they reject the deal.242 Bevis Longstreth, however, notes that there have not
been many viable options available to date.24 3 Second, review of the pro-
posed transaction by the outside nonmanagement directors is not likely to
ensure fairness to shareholders, because these directors may be biased by a
strong sense of loyalty to management and because their discretion is pro-
tected under the business judgment rule.2 ' Finally, the financial opinion of
an investment banker should be approached with caution. As evidenced in
the Stokely Van-Camp, Inc. example,245 where shareholders were told by
investment bankers that $55 was a fair price for a company's stock which
shortly thereafter sold for $77 per share, the range of fairness can be so large
that even expert financial opinions can fail to aid the outside shareholder in
determining what constitutes a fair deal.2 46
The Weinberger and Rabkin decisions minimally ensure the outside share-
holders of receiving a fair deal. In Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court
stated that if the dissenting outside shareholder cannot demonstrate that the
corporation engaged in specific acts of fraud or misrepresentation, or cannot
show why appraisal remedy is insufficient relief,24 7 then the dissenting share-
holder may be relegated to appraisal as the exclusive remedy, with no re-
course to damages or rescission. 248  The burden of proving fraud or
misrepresentation may be very difficult for a plaintiff to overcome, because
of the control group's use of the procedural devices249 to prevent the appear-
ance of fraud or misrepresentation. Even the recent Rabkin decision, which
somewhat broadens the scope of Weinberger to include procedural fairness
questions having a reasonable impact on substantial issues affecting the offer-
ing price per share, 25 0 does not go far enough to ensure the outside share-
holders in a leveraged buyout transaction of an "entirely fair" examination
and relief. To obtain a full procedural fairness examination under Rabkin
that includes a consideration of remedies beyond appraisal proceeding, the
complaining shareholder must allege something more than just "unfair deal-
242. Id. at 10.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 9.
245. See supra notes 12, 235, and accompanying text.
246. B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 8.
247. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
248. Id.; see L. Lederman, R. Citron & R. Macris, supra note 9, at 300.
249. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
250. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1100.
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ing." '25 The charge must allege facts of manipulative conduct. 252 There-
fore, the control group will continue to use these protective procedural
devices to bolster its position in making the leveraged buyout transaction
look "fair" to the outside shareholder group. Rabkin will not protect the
outside shareholders in this situation unless they can show some form of
misconduct by the control group. Thus, in Weinberger and Rabkin, Dela-
ware has effectively adopted the extreme equity interest position stating that
outside shareholders have no additional interests in the corporation other
than the value of their shares, with the right of appraisal in most situations,
as their sole remedy. This position, however, is inappropriate for the mod-
em leveraged buyout transaction.
Conversely, the trilogy consisting of Singer, Tanzer, and Roland, adhered
to the moderate position, allowing the control group to relieve the outside
group of its right to corporate participation, but only when the business pur-
pose "serves the corporate good."' 25 3 The core message expressed in the
Singer trilogy is that outside shareholders cannot be forced to defend their
right to corporate participation by a mere appraisal of their stock's monetary
value.254 As expressly stated in Sterling and the cases of the Singer trilogy,
the corporation's control group owes its shareholders a fiduciary duty of
"entire fairness., 2 55
The outside shareholder is better protected by the moderate position in
the Singer trilogy than by the extreme position in the Weinberger case. Judi-
cial review of the "entire fairness" of the terms of the proposed transaction is
denied under Weinberger, unless the dissenting shareholder demonstrates
fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by the control group or the
appraisal proceeding is shown to be inadequate relief. The Weinberger "en-
tire fairness" test includes only fair dealing and fair price, not business pur-
pose.256 Thus, in most cases, the dissenting outside shareholder will be
limited to appraisal as his only remedy. This result seems harsh, especially
in light of the control group's ability to use the procedural devices to prevent
the appearance of fraud. 257 A return to Singer would grant the outside
shareholder an impartial, independent review of "entire fairness" without a
demonstration of fraud. Moreover, the Singer "entire fairness" test includes
fair dealing, fair price, and a business purpose. Having determined that a
251. Id. at 1105.
252. Id.
253. Coleman, 638 F.2d at 635. See supra note 225 (explaining the meaning of "corporate
good").
254. 638 F.2d at 638.
255. See supra notes 44-49, 52-87.
256. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
257. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
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return to Singer would enhance the outside shareholders' chance of receiving
a fair deal, this Comment turns to the issue of fair price.
B. Fair Price
Low offering prices by control groups attempting a leveraged buyout have
raised questions over the adequacy of the offered consideration. Primarily,
an analysis of fair price should reveal whether the price offered per share to
the outside shareholder group is fair, considering all the circumstances of the
leveraged buyout transaction. The fact that the company's own assets pro-
vide substantially all the financing to purchase the company should be a
sufficient reason to require a higher standard of good faith by the control
group than may be required of other "going private" transactions. Clearly,
if the control group recommends to the outside shareholder group approval
of the proposed buyout transaction at a cash price per share that the control
group knows to be inadequate, then it has breached its fiduciary duty of fair
price. Instead, however, the control group will implement a procedural de-
vice to clothe its proposed offer in apparently fair terms.
The procedural device involves review of the transaction by an investment
banker. By obtaining an investment banker's opinion as to a fair offering
price, the control group assumes a neutral posture and, therefore, the an-
nounced opinion is presumed to be objectively and financially fair. A coop-
erative board of directors will often rely heavily on the fairness opinion in its
judgment of whether the transaction is fair in complying with item 8 of
schedule 13E-3.25 However, the financial opinions of investment bankers
can be grossly below book value, as was demonstrated by the investment
banker's opinion in the Stokely Van-Camp, Inc. buyout.259 Additionally,
the accuracy of financial opinions can be skewed by the limitations that the
control group often places on the investment banker's review.
2 61
Turning to Delaware case law, the Delaware Supreme Court reestablished
in Weinberger that statutory appraisal rights in most situations would be the
basic remedy of the bought-out shareholder. The court updated and ex-
258. See B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 7-9.
259. See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
260. B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 8. A contract between an investment banker and the
hiring company controls the terms of the review. In one fairness opinion, for example, the
investment banker noted:
We were not requested to solicit and did not solicit other purchasers for [the corpora-
tion], the common stock of [the corporation] or the assets of [the corporation] as part
of our engagement. If purchasers of [the corporation] were actively solicited or if the
assets held by [the corporation] were liquidated in an orderly fashion, it is possible
that a price in excess of the equivalent of $68 per share could be realized.
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panded Delaware's appraisal remedy to require consideration of "all rele-
vant factors" involving the value of a company. 26' The court noted that an
assessment of fair value requires generally accepted methods in the financial
community.262 Therefore, absent a showing of fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct, the dissatisfied shareholder in the leveraged buyout alleging an
unfair offering price per share cannot seek rescission or damages relief, but
only appraisal relief equal to "fair value.",263 This could, however, amount
to inadequate relief for the dissatisfied shareholder who may be bought out
at a time when the market value of the shares is low and the elements of
appraisal are favorable to the control group. Moreover, the dissenting share-
holder views appraisal as an unattractive remedy and wishes to avoid it.
2 4
The appraisal proceeding is often cumbersome and ineffective "because of
the court's tendency to rely heavily on the preexisting market price and the
fairness opinions used by management to support its bid.",265 Not only does
it usually require long delays while the price per share is being established,
but litigation over the share value is expensive and often unrewarding.266
Furthermore, because the corporation is an active participant in the ap-
praisal proceeding, has voluminous knowledge about its own affairs, and is
seeking the lowest possible share valuation, the dissenting shareholder is in a
significantly disadvantaged position. 6' Above all, the appraisal proceeding
is risky, because the dissenting shareholder can end up with less cash per
share than the control group originally offered.268
Another factor decreasing the chance for outside shareholders to obtain a
fair price is the control group's inherently imprecise method of determining
a fair price.269 A correlating factor that should be incorporated into the fair
price equation is the incurrence of capital gains taxes or a capital loss by the
outside shareholders independent of whether they are financially prepared to
incur such taxes or losses.270 The outside shareholders may also incur bro-
kerage fees in the process of reinvestment. To compensate for these costs,
the outside shareholders may sometimes be offered the market value plus
some arbitrary amount as an additional premium.27' But the additional pre-
261. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
262. Id. at 712.
263. B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 10.
264. See infra notes 265-68.
265. B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 2.
266. Id. at 10.
267. See generally id.
268. Id. at 10.
269. A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 318.
270. Id.; see Toms, Compensating Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 548 (1978).
271. See Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 VA. L. REV. 1019 (1975); see also De
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mium may well prove inadequate to cover these financial costs.
The control group, on the other hand, may receive values substantially
higher than those of the outside shareholder group because of the disparity
between book values and market values of many corporations following a
buyout.272 Additionally, although there are many intangibles such as good-
will that might significantly contribute to a corporation's profitability, these
factors may not be counted fairly in the valuation of the outside share-
holder's interest because of their intangible nature. 273 A dissatisfied share-
holder alleging an unfair offering price per share is nonetheless restricted
under Weinberger to an appraisal remedy, which does not consider the "gain
to the corporation resulting from a statutory merger."'2 74 Moreover, the dis-
satisfied shareholder has no guaranteed forum in which to contest the con-
trol group's timing of the buyout, which is certainly timed to the control
group's financial advantage. In the same manner, the disclosure require-
ments imposed by the federal securities laws do not ensure a fair price.
Given the difficulties of fairly estimating the value of stock holdings together
with management's ability to offer terms, which may be substantially below
true value, the dissatisfied shareholder should be allowed remedies beyond
mere appraisal to ensure "entire fairness."
A further factor adversely affecting the chance for outside shareholders to
obtain a fair price is management's attitude toward disclosing its own finan-
cial figures on which it bases the terms of the deal.2 75 These are the real
Angelo & De Angelo, The Numbers Show Everyone Profits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1984, § 3, at
2, col. 2. The management-investor purchasing group may use the leveraged buyout transac-
tion to buy out public shareholders at an unfairly low price despite the theoretical defense of
management that the shareholders are paid an above-current market value for their stock,
which they otherwise could not obtain. The authors examined 72 leveraged buyout proposals
by New York and American Stock Exchange companies between 1973 and 1980 and found
that in the typical transaction the compensation paid to public shareholders was on average
56% above prior market value. This figure was said to be similar to premiums in tender offers
during the same period. Id. The authors failed, however, to address the issue of whether the
"highest price" was paid to the shareholders when considering "all relevant factors."
In other fair price discussions, it has been argued that
[i]f the controlling shareholder makes a public tender offer for shares of the corpora-
tion with full disclosure of material information and the offer is accepted by a large
body of shareholders, preferably including some sophisticated investors, the price
paid may be assumed to be fair. If it is fair for such a tender offer, it should be fair
for a going private transaction that immediately follows it.
A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 319. It should be noted, however, that the
tender offer method of ascertaining a fair price is often not available at the time of manage-
ment's proposed leveraged buyout. Id.
272. Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 905-06 (1975).
273. Note, supra note 174, at 797 n.31.
274. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 1981).
275. See Thomas, supra note 4, at col. 5.
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figures, which are kept from the corporation's outside shareholders and seem
to be "management's private preserve." '276 These real figures, which go be-
yond the assets and liabilities listed on the balance sheet, give "meaning and
synthesis to otherwise discrete economic units." '2 77 For example, in the sum-
mer of 1983, David Mahoney, then chairman and chief executive officer of
Norton Simon, Inc., made an unsuccessful leveraged buyout bid for Norton
Simon, Inc. Not only was he not required to reveal the sources of his financ-
ing, but he was not required to share with the outside shareholders the inter-
nal projection figures he had calculated to obtain financing commitments
from lenders.278
The test of fairness, as discussed in subsections A and B above, is not
bifurcated between fair dealing and fair price, but rather is a test of "entire
fairness," encompassing all the characteristics unique to the leveraged
buyout transaction.279 The "entire fairness" analysis should embrace the
idea that neither is the control group's fiduciary duty diluted as its control
percentage increases nor are the outside shareholder group's rights deter-
mined by how small the ownership percentage may happen to be.280 When
management has a control block of at least 50% of the outstanding shares, it
naturally is in the strongest position to force its deal on its outside share-
holders or reject competitive outside bids for the company. Nevertheless,
when management has less than a majority of the shares but otherwise con-
trols the company, it will frequently be able to implement the same proce-
dural devices to convince its outside shareholders that the proposed deal is
fair.2 ' Therefore, whether management has more or less than a majority of
the shares, the same standard of fiduciary duty of "entire fairness" should
apply to the leveraged buyout transaction to ensure that it is objectively fair
to the outside shareholders. To further this objective, the business purpose
of the transaction needs to be analyzed in the "entire fairness" analysis.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1125, where the Delaware Supreme Court found that
[t]he Chancellor's opinion, announced at the preliminary injunction stage of this pro-
ceeding, discussed fairness only in terms of the price offered for the stock, but that
was too restrictive. The test required by Singer, which applied the rule of [Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952)], involves judicial scrutiny for 'en-
tire fairness' as to all aspects of the transaction.
Id.
280. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
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C. Business Purpose
A leveraged buyout should not only have fair dealing (which includes full
disclosure) and a fair price, but also a valid business purpose. The concept
of "entire fairness," therefore, consists of these three primary elements. The
inclusion of a business purpose requirement in the fairness analysis will per-
mit the outside shareholders to challenge the transaction for breach of fiduci-
ary duty even though its structure, disclosure, and price may not be directly
challenged."' 2 The outside shareholders should be able to retain their status
as public shareholders until they either voluntarily sell their shares or are
bought out for a business purpose that considers their best interests. 28 3
Moreover, a valid business purpose implies a benefit to the corporation and
its entire body of shareholders, and not merely a personal purpose of the
control group.284 Therefore, to prevent the achievement of a personal rather
than a business purpose, the purpose of the leveraged buyout should serve a
specific corporate objective.
There has been much discussion and support for imposing a business pur-
pose requirement in the "going private" context. 28 5  Beginning in 1974,
282. A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 321. See also Cross v. Communi-
cation Channels, Inc., 116 Misc. 2d 1019, 456 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (holding that a
shareholder has no cause for complaint that corporate funds are used to finance a buyout
provided there is a valid corporate purpose for the merger and the minority shareholders re-
ceive a fair price for their stock).
283. See A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 323 & n.36 (citing for support
Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372, 1377 (Del. Ch. 1978)) (finding that the exclusion of all
the outside shareholders was unnecessary where the same alleged tax advantages could have
been obtained by the control group through 80% ownership of the company's shares as op-
posed to 100% ownership).
284. A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 322. ("The desire of the majority
solely to obtain for itself the benefits of future profit growth is not a business purpose since it
involves no benefit to the enterprise as such or to the entire body of its shareholders." Id. See
Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 87, at 1365-70 (expressing their view that single company
going private transactions can never be justified). In nonleveraged buyout transactions involv-
ing more than one corporate entity, however, a business purpose of the control group may be a
consideration. Id. See, e.g., Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977)
(holding that a cash-out merger effected primarily to advance a business purpose of the major-
ity stockholder is not rendered impermissible).
285. See Small, The Functions of Directors in Acquisitions of Controlled Corporations,
reprinted in Ninth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation 47, 59 (1978). Mr. Sporkin, then
SEC Director of Enforcement, qualified the requirement of business purpose by stating:
It is not simply a question of articulating a business purpose. It is a question of
whether there is, in fact, a true business purpose. When the controlling person artic-
ulates one purpose and then litigation ensues and it is discovered that the real pur-
pose was something altogether different, then the controlling person is really in some
difficulty.
Id.; see also Tanzer Economic Assocs. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167,
182, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 483 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (for a proposed merger listing several items that
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amidst the growing concern for fairness arising from the "going private"
phenomenon, A.A. Sommer, Jr. stated that even if outside shareholders were
adequately compensated for their bought-out shares, they should not be de-
prived of their future equity participation unless there exists the most "com-
pelling business justification., 286 In response to Sommer's statements, in
early 1975, the SEC proposed rule 13e-3, which would have required "going
private" transactions to have a valid business purpose.287 The rule, however,
was not adopted.
The Singer, Tanzer, and Roland trilogy specifically endorsed the require-
ment of a business purpose. In Singer, the Delaware Supreme Court stated
that the elimination of the minority shareholders in a long-form merger
without a "valid business purpose" was a breach by the majority of its fiduci-
ary duty.288 In Tanzer, the Delaware Supreme Court mentioned that only a
"bona fide" business purpose of the majority shareholders would justify a
merger in which minority shareholders are eliminated.289 Finally, in Ro-
land, the Delaware Supreme Court extended the business purpose require-
ment to include short-form mergers by calling for a "valid business
purpose., 290 The Roland court acknowledged that there was no presump-
tion of proper purpose in a short-form merger, despite its relaxed procedures
for implementing the transaction.
In 1979, despite receiving numerous complaints from dissatisfied share-
holders in other "going private" transactions, 29' the SEC adopted rule 13e-
3, which abandoned the valid business purpose requirement.292 Although
the rule requires the control group to discuss in reasonable detail the pur-
poses and effects of the transaction,293 this is only a procedural disclosure
requirement, without any substantive enforcement mechanism to adequately
would constitute legitimate business purposes); Outwater v. Public Service Corp. of New
Jersey, 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 A. 729 (Ch. 1928), affd, 104 N.J. Eq. 490, 146 A. 916 (1929)
(stating that no purpose would justify extinguishing shareholders from a corporation).
286. A. Sommer, supra note 1, at D-4.
287. See 1975 Proposed Rule 13e-3, supra note 163. Specifically, the alternative rule 13e-
3B, would have required a valid business purpose for the transaction to exist.
288. Singer, 380 A.2d at 979. See supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
289. Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1123-24. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
290. Roland, 407 A.2d at 1036. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 175, 193 and accompanying text.
292. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985).
293. See item 7 of Schedule 13E-3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which reads in
relevant part:
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protect the disadvantaged shareholder.29 4 Similarly, in 1983, the Delaware
Supreme Court, in Weinberger, abandoned the requirement of a valid busi-
ness purpose in corporate mergers as set forth in the Singer, Tanzer, and
Roland trilogy.2 95 However, the Weinberger court's abandonment of this
requirement is wholly inappropriate in the case of a leveraged buyout.
The most compelling reason to require a business purpose in leveraged
buyouts is that the inherent potential for self-dealing may cause the control
group to initiate the buyout for personal and economic purposes rather than
for valid business purposes.2 96 Indeed, the control group should not be able
to use its control for a purpose adverse to the interest of the corporation and
the outside shareholders, such as buying back the public shareholders' inter-
est at a fraction of the price paid by those shareholders for their stock. Fur-
ther, the ability of the control group to increase significantly its ownership in
the acquired company with only a small personal investment adds to the
temptation of implementing a leveraged buyout and can muddle fiduciary
and fairness issues. The foremost consideration should be the business pur-
pose impact on the acquired corporation, not the purposes of the control
group exclusively.2 97 Moreover, the business purpose should be determined
based on the facts and circumstances of each individual transaction and if it
cannot be properly justified, then the transaction should be thwarted.
In sum, the current state and federal laws addressing the leveraged buyout
transaction fail to ensure adequate protection to the disadvantaged and often
dissatisfied shareholder. The temptation for management to overreach is
simply too great to go unchecked. Procedural devices, such as expert finan-
(a)State the purpose(s) for the rule 13e-3 transaction.
(b)If the issuer or affiliate considered alternative means to accomplish such pur-
pose(s), briefly describe such alternative(s) and state the reason(s) for their rejection.
(c)State the reasons for the structure of the Rule 13e-3 transaction and for the
undertaking such transaction at this time.
(d)Describe the effects of the Rule 13e-3 transaction on the issuer, its affiliates and
unaffiliated security holders, including the federal tax consequences.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1985).
294. See supra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
295. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715. In Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court returned
to the principle of Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d at 80 (interpreting a Delaware
short-form merger statute as not requiring a corporation to state a business purpose). Id.; see
also Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 388, 370 N.E.2d 345, 356 (1977) (wherein a state court
commented adversely on the valid business purpose requirement: "Under the Delaware view,
it appears that every proposed merger would be subject to having its bona fides determined by
judicial review. We do not believe the judiciary should intrude into corporate management to
that extent.").
296. A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 321; see also supra notes 206-11
and accompanying text.
297. A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 321.
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cial opinions, outside director approval of the transaction, and outside share-
holder ratification of the transaction, are advanced by management to
influence the public's perception of fair treatment. These procedural safe-
guards, however, have become "boiler-plated passkeys to an advantageous
buyout."'2 9 These procedures are successful in protecting management
from attack, but inadequate in protecting outside shareholders from mis-
treatment, and merely afford a perception of fair treatment.
Leveraged buyout transactions are significantly different from other types
of corporate transactions and often result in disparate treatment between the
two groups of shareholders. The usual criteria of corporate behavior, which
consider the best interests of all shareholders, are absent from the leveraged
buyout transaction.299 Fiduciary and fairness issues can and do become
clouded because of the company's use of its own assets to supply the most
significant portion of the transaction's financing. Yet state and federal laws
fail to acknowledge the unique characteristics of the leveraged buyout trans-
action or make special provisions to ensure adequate fairness and equity to
the disadvantaged shareholder."° Providing additional credence to this
contention is the fact that Delaware, through its recent Weinberger decision,
has eviscerated the concept of "entire fairness" as initially and correctly set
forth in the Sterling decision and correctly developed in the Singer trilogy.
The SEC, similarly through its adoption of the 1979 version of rule 13e-3,
has reduced the concept of "entire fairness" to a mere subjective procedural
level, to a blueprint for corporations to follow and avoid full review of the
fairness of the transaction.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A SUBSTANTIVE "ENTIRE FAIRNESS" STANDARD
The leveraged buyout, a particular type of "going private" transaction,
therefore, requires regulation beyond current state and federal laws. The
plight of the disadvantaged shareholder should no longer be left to the forces
298. B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 16.
299. See A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 318.
300. The purpose of this discussion is to alert the securities industry that the outside share-
holder is not on equal footing with the control group. Notably, however, the outside share-
holder may realize a significant increase in the value of his shares than ever seemed likely in
the absence of a leveraged buyout transaction. See, e.g., Waters, supra note 4, at 48 (concern-
ing a Connecticut-based company, with wine distributing and graphic arts interests, that was
stagnating in the market at about $14 per share but paid its outside shareholders $28 per share
one month later following a buyout). This effect, although beneficial to the outside sharehold-
ers, does not necessarily put him on equal footing with the control group, which enjoys a
panoply of benefits as a result of a leveraged buyout. See supra notes 205-11 and accompany-
ing text.
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of the free market.3" A substantive fairness standard should be imple-
mented embracing the Singer trilogy concept of an "entire fairness" analysis
and its three elements, consisting of fair dealing (which includes full disclo-
sure), fair price, and a valid business purpose. The goal of this advanced
regulation should be to protect the public shareholder, as well as to enhance
the corporate image. Enforcing these themes will tend to preserve the integ-
rity of the marketplace and help to prevent the control group from unfairly
using the leveraged buyout as a technique for snapping up a company at a
cut-rate price. In the absence of a substantive fairness standard, however,
leveraged buyouts could contribute to erosion of the financial markets' integ-
rity and could ultimately affect the ability of publicly-held companies to
raise funds through stock offerings.
A substantive "entire fairness" standard raises several issues regarding
what specific factors should be included in the "entire fairness" inquiry.
Viewed broadly, the applicable fairness standard should both protect the dis-
advantaged shareholder and avoid complex and costly litigation impinging
on the free market forces of competition. Each of the three elements in the
"entire fairness" test should raise specific factor interrogatories.
The factors to be considered under the fair dealing element include a full
disclosure and review of: whether and to what extent the control group's
conflicts of interest affect the outside shareholders; °2 whether the transac-
tion is structured so that approval of at least a majority of the outside share-
holders is required;3 3 whether the transaction requires approval by a
majority of the outside directors;3" whether the outside shareholders are
being shown the same financing figures that the control group is viewing;30 5
whether the control group is affording all potential outside bidders a reason-
able investigation of the company;30 6 and whether the control group is using
stock option plans, lock-ups, and other manipulative devices to prevent
outside competing bids.3 0 7
The factors to be considered under the fair price element include: whether
the terms of the control group's buyout proposal are similar to those made
for comparable companies within a relevant time period;30 8 whether and to
301. But see B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 16 (stating that under ideal circumstances, "the
marketplace has proved to be the best protector of shareholder interests") (emphasis added).
302. See Securities Exchange Commission Release No. 34-15572 (Feb. 15, 1979), supra
note 203, 44 Fed. Reg. at 11,538-39.
303. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
305. See Thomas, supra note 4, at 9, col. 6.
306. See B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 17.
307. See id.
308. See Rothschild, supra note 30, at 230.
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what extent the terms of the transaction are keyed to prevailing market
prices as opposed to considerations of book value, replacement costs, and
historical and prospective operational results;30 9 whether the estimated
value of the benefits to be received by the control group after the transaction
include items such as tax benefits, assets, and goodwill;310 whether, in the
case of competitive bids, the control group matches or exceeds the highest
bid price;3 ' whether and to what extent the seller of the corporation may
have to assume any of the buyer's liabilities;312 whether there is an in-
dependent appraisal of the assets to be sold or leveraged;3 3 and whether the
price per share offering is any lower than that recommended jointly by two
qualified and independent investment bankers.314
The factors to be considered under the business purpose element include:
whether the control group is able to demonstrate a valid business purpose for
the transaction rather than a self-interested purpose;3" 5 whether the business
purpose considers the best interests of the corporation and its entire body of
shareholders;3" 6 and, if the business purpose of the transaction is deemed
"valid", whether the control group's subsequent actions are the least detri-
mental to the outside shareholder group. Although the three factor-lists are
not exhaustive, they are indicative of the types of specific factors that should
be considered in determining the "entire fairness" of the transaction. Under
such an inquiry, either the courts or the SEC or both could examine the
substantive aspects of the leveraged buyout, and could block those transac-
tions in which the control group might treat the outside shareholder group
unfairly.
Finally, a proposition calling for a substantive "entire fairness" standard
raises an additional issue of whether resolution should evolve from the fed-
eral or state level.317 Because the modern corporation frequently engages in
business on a nationwide basis and generally has a multistate shareholder
base, it is reasonable that the problem be resolved at the federal level by the
SEC. A uniform federal standard would bring an in-depth analysis cur-
309. Id.
310. See 1977 Proposed Rule 13e-3(b)(2)(G) to (J), supra note 164.
311. See B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 17.
312. See Interpretative Release, Enforcement Orders Limn SEC Policy on Disclosure Neces-
sary in Leverage Buy-Outs, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 419, at A-I1 (Feb. 21, 1979).
313. Id.
314. See 1975 Proposed Rule 13e-3, supra note 169.
315. See supra notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
316. A.B.A. Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 322.
317. The proper role of the federal and state judiciaries in regulating corporate manage-
ment is a complex issue that is beyond the scope of this discussion. See generally Symposium,
supra note 28.
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rently not provided by disclosure laws.3 18 The SEC should work with the
Congress and the states in formulating a satisfactory solution through legis-
lation.31 9 Moreover, the SEC should seriously reconsider implementing its
earlier proposed remedy addressing the leveraged buyout transaction: the
appointment of a "special review person" to represent and negotiate on be-
half of the outside shareholder group.320 In the same vein, Congress should
consider legislating an explicit mandate enabling the SEC to regulate the
substantive fairness of leveraged buyout transactions.32'
V. CONCLUSION
With the current proliferation of leveraged buyouts, a growing concern
permeates the business community that the public shareholder is being rele-
gated to a disadvantaged position. It is a genuine concern that the share-
holder is being treated unfairly and being offered an unfair price for his
equity interest. Delaware case law and federal securities laws have ad-
dressed this concern in the context of the "going private" transaction, but
their actions have proven inadequate in mitigating potential inequities ema-
nating from this unique form of "going private" transaction. Further, the
procedural safeguards that have been advanced by the corporate community
as "fair" are unworkable for the leveraged buyout. Consequently, the public
shareholder often remains disgruntled and disadvantaged. Thus, leveraged
buyouts present the danger that the public shareholder will become even
more incensed by American corporate mores and the securities markets than
he or she has become.322 The leveraged buyout transaction, therefore, de-
mands a special substantive scrutiny that involves a review of its "entire
fairness." This mandatory "entire fairness" analysis requires an examina-
tion of the transaction with respect to its fair dealing (which includes full
disclosure), fair price and a valid business purpose. By implementing an
upgraded form of regulation for the leveraged buyout transaction, such as
the one outlined above that considers the particular character and sensitivi-
ties of this transaction, the public shareholder can gain the lost protection
318. See Note, supra note 174, at 802.
319. B. Longstreth, supra note 3, at 13.
320. See Securities Exchange Commission Release No. 34-15572, supra note 203, 44 Fed.
Reg. at 11,540. Understandably, this proposed remedy may have some shortcomings, such as
an overambitious review person or a time delay in negotiating between the parties, but they can
be assuredly rectified through administrative compromise.
321. See Note, supra note 174, at 816-17 ("Although the Santa Fe decision calls into ques-
tion the propriety of substantive regulation of fraud under Exchange Act provisions, that case
. . . does not render substantive regulation under the rule improper.").
322. See generally A. Sommer, supra note 1.
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and increase his or her confidence in the securities markets and the Ameri-
can corporation.
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